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ABSTRACT
The deciding of foreign policy for any Government is complex. This
report develops a framework to analyse this complexity with a case
study of the key policy change by the South African government to date.
The decision to switch diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to
the People's Republic of China involved the full range of ideological,
political and economic dimensions. Data was ga1hered from interviews
and documents, which was analysed by developing themes and using a
coding and matrix system.
The study explores the traditional models of decision making, the
"Rational Actor", "Organisational Process" and "Bureaucratic Politics",
and argues that none alone can explain and predict foreign policy. It
considers whether a hybrid model, combining all three, is a satisfactory
framework in this case. It concludes that the decisive intervention of
President Mandela cannot be incorporated into the traditional models
and so a framework called model Z for conver.ience was developed.
Whether President Mandela's (or his successor's) personality and
leadership style will determine foreign policy into the millennium and
therefore need to be permanently incorporated in a new theoretical
model is not certain.
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GLOSSARY
The TINa China's
The People's Republic of China (PRC), a. k. a. Mainland China,
The Republic of China (ROC), a.m. the Island of Taiwan.
The three traditional decision-making models explored:
The "Rational Actor" Model
The "Organisational Process" Model
The "Bureaucratic Politics" Model
The 'China' decision:
This refers to the decision by the South African government to reverse
the I\.~artheid government's elevation of the ROC over the PRC by
assuming diplomatic relations with the PRC and breaking ot ' diplomatic
relations with the ROC.
Decision
The decision means the prior recommendations to and the
announcement of the President on the 2ih November 1996.
Satisfactory Framework of Analysis
In this research, appropriate framework of analysis means the
theoretical approach which most economically includes, describes and
predicts the actions of individuals and organisations within the State.
A Hybrid Approach
A combination of the Rational Actor, Organisational Process and the
Bureaucratic Politics model.
x
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ANC African National Congress
CCP Chinese Communist Party
'cPS The Centre for Policy Studies
.-
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
FGD Foundation for Global Dialogue
GNU Government of National Unity
NAM Non A.ligned Movement
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NP National Party
OAU Organisation for African Unity
PRe People's Republic of China
ROC Republic of China
SACP South African Communist Party
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
.-
SADC Southern African Development Community
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCT!ON
1.1. Background to the research
During the 1990's, many changes took place in the world. Two of the most
significant are firstly globalisation, notably the rise of trading blocks (e.g.
Europoan Union), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATTNVTO) and the "economic miracle" of the Asian Giants. Secondly on
November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell whici; ISl{ to the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.
In the arena of international relations, these changes ushered in a new era.
In many countries, security concerns based on ideological differences
arguably lost their place as the chief determinant of the foreign policy of
nations and economic interest became more important in foreign relations.
Internally, South Africa changed in the 1990's. The watershed elections of
1994 spelled the end of apartheid and ushered in a democratic
dispensation in a new South Africa ruled by the Government of National
Unity (GNU). Throughout this period, (the 1990's), South Africa focused on
domestic issues. Examples of these domestic issues are the elections,
delivery of Vie Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and
the transformation of the civil service.
Externally, South Africa's international status changed from being "a pariah"
(Mills: 1995, p.81), to being the toast of the world. It was no longer
necessary for South Africa to buy favours from the rest of the world. to
2
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spend millions on defensive and offensive military ventures, or to drive a
siege economy. A newly democratic South Africa, led by President
Mandela, a person with international stature, could now proudly take up its
rightful place as part of the international community.
1.2. Effect of changes on the department of foreign affairs
The changed internal and external conditions had a profound effect on the
Department of Foreign Affairs. At the time (1995), the Department of
Foreign Affairs and its minister, Alfred Nzo, wers severely criticised by
some academics and sections of the medic for not effecting significant
changes. Mr. Nzo was also criticised for not formulating a policy that could
serve as a clear framework within which foreign policy decision making
could take place. For example, "What is not clear is the bottom-line vision or
position of South Africa's foreign policy" (Daniel: 1995,p.36), and "the new
South African government is struggling to develop a firm, coherent and
principled foreign policy orientation. Effective implementation strategies also
appear to be lacking" (van Nieuwkerk: 1996, p.3)
For the first time in South African history, ".cl foreign affairs budget (1995~
1996) was hotly debated in parliament when~ the new political leadership
questioned the principles and priorities underlying the budgetary
allocations. Questions were asked as to why South Africa still had so many
missions in Europe when it needed to align the expenditure of its limited
resources with the new policy of closer ties with Africa. Within ~his context
South Africa's diplomatic recognition of many countries were re-examined.
South Africa's diplomatic recognition of the Republic of c.una (ROC)
instead of the People's Republic of China (PRC) surfaced as a debate
within many organisations and in the media. (Mills: 1995; Cronin: 19')6)
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1.3. The dilemma for South Africa
Daniel (1995:158) explained the dilemma as: "shouid South Africa retain its
official ties with an old ally (albeit one linked to the previous apartheid
regime) with whom it has developed a[n] economically advantageous
relatlonshlp or should it abandon that ally in tavour of a government wit~,a
wretched human rights record but a market of immense proportions and
[whose] economy is currently the world's fastest growmg?"
The dilemma was further complicated by the fact that whatever decision
was made, "South Africa's foreign policies toward the PRC and ROC
respectively are inextricably linked" (Davies: 1996, p.117).
According to a number of writers (Kent-Brown, 1996; Sono, 1995;Mills,
1995; Suttner, 1995),the dilemma forced South Africa to choose between
three alternatives:
() maintain the status quo (meaning that South Africa would continue its
diplomatic recognition of the ROC)
e attempt dual recognition (meaning that South Africa would try to have
formal diplomatic relations at the same time with both the ROC and the
F'RC)
8 recognise the People's Republic of China (and downgrade diplomatic
relationswith Taiwan)
Choosing any of the first two alternatives would have resulted in South
Africa maintaining ties with only the Republic of China as the People's
Republic of China stated clearly that it would not tolerate dual recognition.
"Dual recognition" as Kent-Blown (1996: 72) states, "has proved to be a
futile policy proposal in the light of the historical experience of third states
4
who soon found out that the PRC would rather terminate relations than
accede to this erranqement."
Choosing to switch diplomatic racognition from the Republic of China
(ROC) to the People's Republic of Cbina (PRC) was, according to many
(Kent-Brown: 1996, Mills: 1995, f uttner: 1985), the best alternative South
Africa had given its national interests. As it turned out, this was the
alternative SouthAfrica chose.
1.4. The announcement
On the 27th November 1996, President Mandela anr ounced that South
Africa would recognise the People's Republic of China. (Mandela: 1996)
Although this announcement was a summersault on his earlier position,
since "As recently as September, [1996] Mandela gave visiting RoC Vice -
Pemier Hsu Li-The categoric assurances that we would not switch
allegiance." (The Star: 28.12.1996), many South Africans accepted it with a
sigh of relief. For example, The Star (28.12.1996), stated that "At last South
Africa has resolved its China policy"
This announcement was preceded by a debate about whether South Africa
should have diplomatic ties with the Republic of China or the People's
Republic of China. Most of the individuals and institutions engaged in the
debate focused on the arguments for and against the recognition of the
Peoples Republic of China or the Republic of China.
This paper examines two issues:
• How did the South African government manage the decision making
process regarding the diplomatic recoqnition of either the People's Republic
of China or the Republic of China? and
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.. Could a satisfactory (see glossary) framework to analyse how the South
African government managed the decision making process, be found?
1.5. The research problem
1.5.1. Problem statement
How did the South African government manage the decision making
process regarding the ciiplomatic recognition of the People's Republic
of China?
1.6. The objectives of the research
1.6.1. Primary objective
The objec .v9 of this research is to:
• Assess whether a 'Hybrid approach' (see glossary) provides an satisfactory
framework of analysis for the decision making process engaged in by the
South African Government, regarding the diplomatic recognition of the
People's Republic of China.
1.6.2. Secondary objectives
In order to achieve the primary objective, the research attempts to:
" establish who made foreign policy decisions during the period 2ih April
1994 to 2ih November 1997, in South Africa
.. establish who influenced foreign policy decisions during this period
• establish what decision making process the decision makerls engaged in
.. ldentify the principle/s on which the decision makers based their decisions
6
co identify which priorities and whose priorities drove the decisions
05 establish the impact of the tensions between different principles and
priorities on South Afncan fo!eign policy decision making
e The core of this research centres on a decision. Every day, decisions
are made in gov8rnment. These decisions have profound effects on the
lives of individuals, and the history of nations. For example:
• The American decision to send American troops to Vietnam,
e The effect of Hitler's foreign policy decisions on the history of the
German nation and other nations in the Baltic area.
Decisions made in the foreign policy arena can influence the relationships
between nations for decades. Even though they are important, many of
these decisions are not made in a manner transparent to the observer. "It is
like a black box" (Hilsman: 1993, p.52). One can see what comes out of it,
but one does not know how the decision was made. "The essence of
ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer - often, indeed, to
the decider himself ... There will always be the dark and tangled stretches
in the decision making process - mysterious even to those who may be
most intimately involved" (Kennedy: speech 1962).
This research attempts to look inside this black box. It explains the basic
three theoretical models of decision making as they apply to foreign policy
decision making. It proposes that a hybrid approach, which is a combination
of the three models, provides a 'satisfactory' framework to analyse the
pa tlcular decision making process in the switching of diplomatic recognition
from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China.
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1.7. Scope of the study
This research report consists of seven chapters. The second chapter
reviews the literature relevant the unit of analysis (that is the
management of the decision making process leading to the recognition of
the PRe), the context of the research, and the theory underpinning the
study. The third chapter contains the proposition and explores tentative
solutions to the research problem. The fourth chapter describes and
justifies the selected research methodology in detail. Chapter five presents
the results as objectively and clinically as possible. The research results
show overwhelmingly the existence of another framework, called framework
Z for the sake of convenience (See Appendixes 5 and 7). Inadequate
evidence was found to substantiate the propositron that a combination of
the three models, a hybrid approach, provide the satisfactory framework of
analysis of decision making on the 'China' decision.
The interpretation of the research results is covered ill chapter six. This
chapter focuses on the meaning of the results examined in the light of the
proposition posed in chapter three.
The results are interpreted in the following way:
The decision making process on the 'China' decision had two phases
Phase 1: Arriving at the Recommendations
Phase 2: Arriving at the Announcement
For Phase 1, the Rational Actor model (related to and in some literature
equivalent to the Realist Paradigm) shaped the thinking of most actors.
8
National interest formed the basis for the recommendation. Within
organisations, the bureaucratic politics model was active (notably
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) & South African Communist Party
(SACP)). Overall, the organisational process model had insignificant
impact. After the conflict and debate within organisations ran its course, a
'democratic' majority decision making consensus was reached. The result
of this conser.sus was accepted as the recommendation, which was used to
'lobby' the President.
For Phase 2, only framework Z was relevant. Only the President decided.
His personality, sense of morality, values and worldview impacted. There is
no evidence that anyone of the other three models were active. None of
the three or the proposed hybrid model can explain the delays, the specific
timing of the announcement. etc. Phase 1 amounted to a futile exercise
without Phase 2. But Phase 2 was not necessarily dependent on Pihase 1.
The President acted independently from Phase 1 but Phase 1 actors or
agitators or managers could not act without him.
The concluding chapter seven attempts to provide additional insights and
propose ideas for further research. Some of the ideas are based on the
questions that could form the basis for future research.
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•CHAPTER 2: UTERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
In this section of the report literature on the context of the research will be
reviewed. The broad context of the research is policy making in government
and the specific context of the research is foreign policy making. The
literature on the background will be reviewed as well as literature on the
theoretical models used in foreign policy making. These models offer
different explanations of how foreign policy decisions are made. Apart from
looking at the three models used most often, ! will also discuss a fourth,
hybrid approach.
2.2. Context
2.2.1. General policy making in Government
Dunn (1994:185) defines public policy as " A complex pattern of
interdependent collective choices, including decisions not to act, made by
governmental bodies and officials". He further describes policy formulation
as, "the development and synthesis of alternative solutions for policy
problems." According to Dunn (1994:185), policy problems are extracted
from problem situations by stakeholders whilst he defines a problem
situation as " A situation or set of external conditions which, once
experienced, gives rise to dissatisfaction, uneasiness, and a felt recognition
that something is wrong" (Dunn: 1994, p.185)
10
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Within the particular case examined in this research, the problem situation
developed around the Issue of whether South Africa must establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China or maintain
diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. Stakeholders in and outside
of government recognised this situation as a policy problem and the debate
for alternative solutions to this problem started in South Africa since before
April 1994, and continues to be debated, despite the presidential
announcement (Sona: 1995, p.72).
2.2.2. Foreign policy making
Wallace (1971: 11) provides two definitions of Foreign Policy. The first is
a stable set of attitudes towards the international environment, an
implicit or explicit plan about a country's relationship with the outside
world: a conscious image of what ie or ought to be the country's place
in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining
or influencing decisions on specific is.sues.
As a young democracy South Africa was at the time of the announcement
and during the decision making process, trying to define its image of what is
or ought to be its place in the world. This added to the complexity of
managing the decision making process.
The second definition he provides is
a field of related but distinct actions and issues, in which there
neither is or can be foreign policy in general, in which policy is
formed in a disjointed fashion, largely in response to immediate
pressures and events, in a number of structures and iSSUeareas
This second definition is very applicable to the 'China' decision. The Hong
Kong hand over was an immediate pressure, and through the research it
11
was attempted to ascertain whether foreign policy formulation on this
particular issue was disjointed.
2.2.3. The importance of examining decision making processes in
foreign policy
Kegley, (1987:249) makes a strong case for the necessity of examining
decision-making processes in foreign policy making. "Only by Incorporating
decision making level phenomena can domestic and international factors be
causally linked to foreign policy behaviour".
2.2.4. The importance of the individual decision maker
This section draws attention to the influence of the individual in decision
making processes. As much as individuals are part of organisations, and
the decision are attributed to the organisation, the fact remains that
individual actors within the organisation caused the decision to be taken.
Individuals have different personalities and leadership styles which enables
innovation and creativity.
Kegley (1987: 249) emphasises the importance of the human decision
maker and th'~:r rIP; -sptlons in the formulation of foreign policy.
National ann International circumstances do not make decisions and
forge foreign policy ; decision makers alone do this. How decision
makers perceive the positive and negative incentives of foreign
policy options determines the ultimate course of action. In theorizing
12
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about the sources of foreign policy behaviour, we should begin with
individuals, because only persons think, prefer and act.
And
In asking us to take into account human actlons, it demands that
we escape the deterministic logic that has attempted to explain
national behaviour abroad by reference exclusively to the political,
social, and economic forces that influence decisions, but not by
reference to the decision makers who, in the last analysis, do the
deciding
Merritt, (1975: p. 4) also argues for the importance of the individual to be
acknowledged and highlights the influence of personalities. He states that
decisions are made by individuals, each with a distinctive personality.
The interplay of personalities of decision-makers, group dynamics as
decision makers inter act, representative processes in the sense that
top-level decision makers are tied into different bureaucracies and
other social groupings. The qualities of the information-processing
system r
attentio
. line the issues to which foreign policy makers pay
e goals they pursue in the international arena.
Wher erguson and Mansbach (1989:81) draws attention to the
indi .; and the groups through which the individual exert influence.
Ferguson and Mansbach (1989:81), state that "states do not
act., individual leaders act, bureaucracies act, ruling elites act".
2.3. The nature of decisions
Toma and Gorman (1991:133-135), classify decisions made in foreign
affairs, as macro, micro and crisis decisions. The macro decisions
encompass the perceptions of the leadership, involve position statements
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on major, onqoing policy issues and provide the guidelines for routine
operations. Micro decisions, are narrow in scope and are handled at the
lower levels of the organisation because they do not require the attention of
the authoritative decislon makers. Crisis decisions involve high level
decision makers and are necessitated by conditions or situations of threat
or gravity.
Grindle and Thomas (1989:229), distinguish between crisis and non-crisis
(politics-as- usual) decisions.
Circumstances of crisis (actual crisis or perception of crisis) or
politics-as-usual distinguish whether problems are pressing or
chosen. Pressing problems are those that are forced on the policy
makers through pressure from injured or interested outside parties;
chosen problems are those that decision makers have picked out of
the thin air as a result of their own preferences and perc- >ions"
Grindle and Thomas (1989:229) continue to say that perception of
crisis will raise the concerns policy elites had about political stabilty
for example, and therefore caution them to assess the political and
economic consequences of the options open to them.
These kind of conditions may lead to innovative changes, whereas
mundane concerns lead 't..:' incremental changes. So according to
Grindle and Thomas (1989:229), if the conditions preceding the
'China' decision was perceived by the policy elit"l as conditions of
crisis it would lead to an innovative change on South Africa's policy
towards the Chinas. If the policy elites considered it a mundane
issue, only incremental cha 1ge would have happened to the way in
which South Africa relate diplomatically to both the ROC and the
PRC.
'.4
2.4. Background to the research
2.4.1. Histo~ of the relations between the Republic of China and
South Africa
Some political commentators assumed that after the elections an entirely
new government with a new administration would be running the country.
However, the Government of National Unity (GNU) inherited the
administration of the old government. Wit.h it, the GNU also inherited the
foreign relation partners of the previous government. Historically, the
Republic of China and not the People's Republic of China had relations with
apartheid South Africa. This South Africa-Republic of China alliance was a
strategic alliance.
Taiwan was given diplomatic status in 1976, by the previous government
(Feng: speech 1996). This was the year of the Soweto uprisings after which
South Africa became increasingly isolated from the international
community. At the time, Taiwan was also being increasingly isolated from
the international community. In October 1971, Taiwan lost its seat in the
United Nations. In 1979, the United States of America (USA) changed its
policy to a "one China policy" (Davies: 1996, p.44). This meant the', the
United States of America recoqnlsed the People's Republic of China, .s the
sole representative of the Chinese people. South Africa's alliance with
Taiwan was forged in these circumstances of international isolation of both
countries, when both countries needed each other. They developed "close
relations collaborating on al ms production and commercial exchange"
(James: 1996, p.3).
1 Refer to appendix 9 for a fuller chronology
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2.4.2. History of South African relations with the People's Republic of
China2
The Department of Foreign Affairs, with its "principle of universality" (Daniel:
1995, p.34), explored establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, whilst
South Africa still maintained its diplomatic recognition Of the ROC. The PRC
refused to have diplomatic relations with South Africa whilst South Africa
still gave the ROC diplomatic status (Suttner: 1995, p.6). Chinese officials
viewed South Africa's recognition of the ROC as equivalent to China
recognising any attempt at independence on fhe part of KWaZulu (Suttner:
1995, p.6).
2.4.3. The People's Republic of China view
The PRC viewed the ROC as a "renegade" province (Mills: 1995, p.87).
"Peking maintains that Taiwan is part of China" (Moorsteen and
Abramowitz: 1971, p. 3). As such, the PRC Insisted only one China existed
and only one China can have state to state relations as the true
representative of the Chinese people.
For Beijing, the principle of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan as a
matter of perceived national dignity, as a crucial aspect of political
legitimacy for the government, and for strategic considerations - is
of such primacy that it is not willing to renounce its nght (Council on
Foreign Relations-USA: '1995, p.10).
2.4.4, The Republic of China view
2 Refer to appendix 9 for fuller chronology
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The ROC does not dispute the fact t iat there is one China. It does
however, plead the case for separate independent governments. It also
operates like an independent entity. It has its own army, bureaucracy and
even had its first democratic elections for a pres.dent in March 1996. "It
has been noted that Taiwan is a de facto independent entity" (Lee: 1995,
p.24).
2.4.5. The importance of the ROC and the PRe to South Africa
Radebe, J. (1995:9), briefly summarised South Africa's strong trade,
investment and aid links with the Republic of China. "Taiwan is South
Africa's sixth largest trading partner, with a two way trade of R4.4. billion i.1
1994, according to RSA customs figures. By ROC customs figures, it is
R5.36 billion ... Taiwan has invested R1.5 billion creating over 40 000 jobs
ir. over 280 factories ... agreements for trade, investment, technical co-
operation and financial assistance total[ling] R1.1 billion". He continues to
state that if all goes well with the proposed petrochemical project with the
ROC, "It will be the largest foreign investment South Africa has ever seen"
(Radebe: 1995, p.9). Besides, the Republic of China support for the RDP is
larger than that of some G7 countries, totalling nearly R566million (Themba
Sono: 1995, p.80). For example, Taiwan is the only country which has
committed itself to co-finance with "the World Bank, a $100 million loan to
increase the competitiveness of small and medium sized light
manufacturing industries in South Africa" (Business Day: 1996, p.3). The
state of the South African economy, some argue, though not desperate, is
embattled (20% devaluation in the value of the Rand3 from February to
3 The South African currency is called thE' Rand
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December 1996) enough to do without the possible further negative
repercussions of losing a valuable trade ally and RDP supporter.
On the other hand "weighing heavily on the collective mind of [a]
heterogenous group consisting of business, academics and the ANC, is the
reality of the PRC as an awakening economic and strategic superpower
(van Niewkerk: 1996, p.3)." If rfiplomatic links with the PRC are not
established soon, South Africa mignt lose out on important trade and
investment opportunities with "an emerging economic giant" (Mills: 1995,
p.84). Mills (1~~5:96) argues, that ill the future, the long term economic and
political intere .s of South Africa lie with the PRC and not the ROC.
In most of the regional and international interstate organisations to which
South Africa belongs, the PRC is recognised and given sole diplomatic
status (Suttner: 1995, p.4). Mills (1995:88) also raises the issue of the
PRC's membership of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). If
South Africa wants to become Africa's representative on the UN Security
Council, how can it expect success if it does not even recognise the PRC
diplomatically?
The Unites States of America (USA), changed its foreign policy toward the
Republic of China In 1979, recognising the People's Republic of China,
which then replaced the ROC on the UN Security Council. South Africa,
with its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China, were clearly out of
line with major international organisations, most of Africa, and the major G7
countries that are also South Africa's major trading partners.
2.5. The relevance of the research
The process of how the 'China' decision was made, and its basis, was of
relevance to the future of SA relations with other countries of the world.
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"The dilemma and its resolution [provided] a clear indication of which
factors [were] primarily driving South Africa's "new foreign policy" (Daniel:
1995, p.159). Light will be shed on the relative importance of principles
such as human rights, economic interests, security interests, the promotion
of the Southern African Development Countries, and African interests.
On the other hand demands are made iUI Couth Africa to pursue moral and
idealistic values in its foreign policy like with the Indonesia- East Timor
issue. "How does the ... cosying up to Indonesia and Morocco square with
the African National Congress .. , pledge ... to canonise human rights in our
international relations?" (Daniel: 1995, p.35)
The first founding provision in the constitution of South Africa, as adopted
by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996, refers to the "advancement
of human rights and freedoms" (Constitution of South Africa Act: 1995). By
way of the Constitution, South Africa had committed itseV \0 human rights
as a basis for all its relations, internal and international. Also, people around
the world expected this moral stance because of South 1\ 'rica's struggle
legacy and the image of Presu.ent Mandela as a relentless fighter for
human rights, justice, equality and freedom. Thus pressure is put on South
Africa to pursue moral causes to the point of sacrificing its own economic
interests.
2.5.1. The basis for foreign policy decision making
Kegley (1987, p. 250) provided a definition of foreign policy that resemble
the Rational Actor model and Realist paradigm. He stated that foreign
policy is "created by the articulation and aggregation of interests" (Kegley:
1987, p. 250). These 'interests' form the basis of foreign policy decision
making. Decision making in foreign policy is based on what is termed
"national interest" (Kegley' 1987, p. ?!:i0).
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Sono (1995:73), quotes South African Defence Minister Joe Modise: "We
have our own national interests and it is tt,dse national interests which must
be satisfied. I am certain that the PRe will want co satisfy its own national
interests first, before it thinks of any other interests". The question however
for South Africa at this point in time is "what constitutes its national
interest?" The South African Foreign Policy discussion document (South
Africa Government: 1995), does not address the issue of South Africa's
national interests explicitly. It does refer to Africa, economic relations and
political and security priorities, as South Africa's international priorities
(South Africa government: 1995, p.17). The document outlines South
Africa's foreign policy principles as a commitment to:
• the promotion of human rights;
• the promotion of democracy; justice and international law in the conduct of
relations between nations;
• international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the
resolution of conflicts;
• the interests of Africa in World Affairs and economic development through
regional and international co-operation in an interdependent world." (South
Africa Foreign Policy Discussion Document: 1995, p. 15).
These principles outlined in the South African Foreign Policy Discussion
Document, (1995, p.15) seems to be a combination of realism (or rational
actor) and idealism, It defines South Africa's national interest (a rational
actor or realist paradigm concept) as the promotion of ideals like human
rights.
Added to the question of what constitutes the national interest of South
Africa, is the question of time frames. "national interest, dictates the nature
of a state's long-term effort in foreign policy and governs what it does in a
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short-term context ... national interest provides the necessary measure of
consistency to national policy" (Lerche and Said: 1963,p.7).
2.6. DECISION MAKING MODELS
For the purposes of this research, the formulation of the three decision
making models as defined below were used. When scrutinising the
literature on decision making theories, it appears that many other models
exist. However the researcher sees these as other "names" or labels for the
same basic three models. For example, Hilsman, Gaugran and Weitsman
(1993:49), called the Rational Actor model the rational process model and
also the traditional, strategic geopolitical point of view. Some 'new' models
are variations of the basic three used below. (Toma and Gorman: 1991)
For the purposes of this study the three different decision making processes
are identified by the comparative foreign policy school of thought. These are
the rational actor model, the organisational process model, and the
bureaucratic politics model. (Toma & Gorman: 1991: 135)
2.6.1. The Rational Actor Model
According to Toma and Gorman (1991: 135), rational actors use the
following process:
• they define a situation that calls for a decision after an objective
consideration of facts,
• they specify the goals by ranking them according to priorities, and then
consider all available means for reaching the objectives,
., they select the one objective that will maximise the goal achievement, and
take well-calculated actions to implement the decision.
This model assumes that governments consist of united purposive
strategists, who have full information, and can therefore calculate and
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implement actions on the basis of how best to maximise power and
security. This view assumes an ideal situation for decision makers. (Torna
and Gorman: 1991)
The Rational Actor model assumes that irrespective of differences in the
ideological beliefs of decision makers or the leadership of different
governments, they will behave in a similar fashion: "the analyst does not
need to know anything about the leaders of a state. They will behave the
same no matter who they are ... It does not matter that one state was a
monarchy and the other a communist dictatorship, for both behaved the
same" (Hilsman et. al.: 1993, p.S2).
Robbins (1991: p153-179), provides a detailed explanation of what the
decision making process is as well as how it can be managed best. He
states that decision making permeates every facet of a manager's job, so
that it is not incorrect to say that decision rnaklnq is synonymous with
managing. He defines the decision making process as "a set of eight steps
that begins with formulating a problem, moves to selecting an alternative
that can alleviate the problem, and concludes with evaluating the decision's
effectiveness" (Robb.ns: 1991, p153-179). The eight steps, typical of the
rational actor model, are identified as:
1. Formulating a problem,
2. Identifying decision criteria
3. Allocating weights to the criteria
4. Developing alternatives
5. Analysing alternatives
6. Selecting an alternative
7. Implementing the alternative
8. Evaluating decision effectiveness (Robbins: 1991).
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The critique of the Rational Actor model expressed by Toma and Gorman,
(1991: 135) is that it ignores two very important constraints. The first
constraint is dissent among policy makers and disagreements in the
interpretations of costs and benefits based on ideological and cultural
differences and the second constraint relates to those constraints
associated with the broad determinants of human behaviour such as
perception, socialisation, personality development, intelligence, attitudes
and values. The rational actor model also assumes perfect information
which is an assumption that is very difficult to realise.
Kegley (1987:253) differs with this rational actor model. He argues that
individuals are often guided by a set of rules to help in decision making.
The environment for foreign policy makers is not conducive to pure
rationality; it encourages decision making by deference to rules
rather than by a cost benefit analysis of the relative merits of all
possible options. Rationality is bounded, because the need to take
short cuts in calculating decision costs encourages the acceptance
of satisfactory rather than maximal options. Deference to
sanctioned rules for choice thus serve policy makers interests,
even though rationality is compromised.
2.6.2. The Organisational Process Model
This model argues that decision making is done in a quasi - mechanical
way. The organisational model, "makes decisions through a quasi-
mechanical reference to past decisions, precedence, routines, or
governmental roles, based on standard operating procedures of
governmental organisations" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.137).
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Toma and Gorman (1991:137), explain the assumptions on which this
model is based as every government is made up of a conglomerate of
loosely allier! organisations. These organisations function according to
standard patterns of behaviour and they are fairly predictable '~ecause of
their bureaucratic nature.
The major critique of the organisational process model centres on the fact
that individual behaviour cannot be standardised. It is inevitable that an
individual's personal norms and values will influence an organisation's
decision making ~Toma and Gorman: 1991). "By the time the information
from the field is processed through the orqanisa'ions bureaucratic network
and presented in a condensed form to the authoritative decision maker's, it
very likely will include PI es, biases, distortions and omissions"
(Torna and Gorman: 1991: 13/).
2.6.3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model
According to this model, governments are composed of many parts,
including individuals and organisations and decisions are seen as "the
products of the interaction, adjustment and politics of peopie and
organisations. Foreign Policy is seen as a result of a political process
consisting of bargaining, compromise, adjustment, arm twisting, favouritism
and even unethical methods used for political or personal gain. A state's
foreign policy is therefore not that of a monolithic actor whose participants
in the process see everything alike" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p. 136).
If this definition of the bureaucratic model is accepted as true for the
formulation of foreign policy, it does not come as a surprise then that the
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"parliamentary foreign policy budget debate held in May 1995 demonstrated
a lack of consensus in many areas of South Africa's foreign relations" (Mills:
1995, p.81).
This model does not \. ,Iy recognise the existence of the different actors, it
also points out that the different actors play different roles and exert
different levels of influence according to their position of power in the
bureaucracy. "The players in the decision making process are playing
different roles and exerting different influences on different types of
decisions under consideration. The most important players being on top/ in
the centre of the circle, the less important players will be lower in the
pyramid or on the periphery of the circle" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.137).
A different way of looking at the realist-idealist debate is looking at the
issues of power and morality. Wallace (1971: 12) provides two views as to
what the foreign policy objectives of a country is. The first view holds that
"whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the
immediate aim. States pursue their national interests in foreign policy and
their national interest can be defined as the maximisation of national power"
(Wallace: 1971, p.12}
The second view, hold that "the pattern of objectives which policy makers
pursue are more complicated, and less coherent. Considerations of
prestige, economic gain, domestic advantage, as well as national security
form part of .. , the country's foreign policy. For thee= writers, it is more
apprpriate to talk of interests rather than single nationa: interest, to look for
a number of separate and often conflicting objectives rather than for a
single overriding operational goal" (Wallace: 1971, p.12).
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Hilsman et. al. (1993: p.ix) examines the specific roles and powers of the
inner ring of power centres-both individuals and institutions. These inner
ring entities, are those role players "who are directly involved in making
defence and foreign policy" (HUsman et.al.: 1993,p.ix). In a South African
context one may classify this inner ring as the President, the deputy
president, the departments of foreign affairs, trade and industry and
finance. Possibly the party' caucuses or powerful groupings within the
African National Congress party caucus and the parliamentary portfolio
committees on Foreign Affairs and on Trade and Industry can be included.
Hilsman et.al. (1993:ix) continue to examine the powers of the second ring-
consisting of those individuals and organisations who are not officially part
of government but whose principal purpose is to influence foreign and
defence policy. This analysis deals with the influence of interest groups and
the media. On the 'China' decision, this ring includes non-governmental
organisations (NGO's) like the South African Institute of International Affairs
(SAIIA), the Centre for Policv Studies, academics, as well as journalists in
the South African rner'ia who are important opinion makers and who
regularly write about Soutl: Africa's economic and other interests. The outer
ring consists of the electorate and public opinion. This outer ring of power
can be very influential, as is demonstrated by the numerous successful
protest marches in South Africa and around the world, for example, the anti-
Vietnam war protests in America.
Yet, authors like Rothstein (1972: 22-23) is particularly severe in his
summary of the historical influence of public opinion on F oreiqn Affairs
issues. He states that, the "opinion of the mass on foreign policy issues has
been apathetic, disinterested and decidedly unprofound" Rothstein (1972:
22-23}. According to Rothstein (1972:2'3) the direct impact of mass opinion
is felt only when one group or another believe that it is about to lose on a
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crucial decision. This group then leaks information in an effort to redress the
balance, or when the elite is so divided over ends and means that it cannot
isolate outside opinion as irrelevant or uninformed. A long term disaster, in
which the costs begin to pile up in the form of casualty lists or increased
taxes, may also force the public from apathy to more proactive action. But,
accordirg to him, the most probable outcome of mass opinion is increased
support for the government in power and increased hatred for dissenters.
The pronouncements of Rothstein (1972:23) on public opinion and foreign
policy, is riot borne out by the views expressed by the South African public
in a recent survey. Marklnor (an independent private sector research
company) did a survey (November 1997), for the Foundation for Global
Dialogue (FGD). The survey tried to gauge the South African public's
opinion on the Government's decision to switch diplomatic ties from the
Republic of China to the People's Republic of China.
Forty- four percent of the respondents judged the decision as
'right' compared to the 34 percent who said 'wrong'. The ANC
and PAC supporters were generally in support u,' the decision.
36 percent of the former said it was right for econornlo reasons,
and a further 16 percent said it was in line with tnternotlonal
practice (overall support of 52 percent). NP and DP supporters
had different opinions. 45 percent of NP and an overwhelming
70 percent of DP supporters were of the opinion that the
decision was wrong. South Africans judge their government's
handling of foreign policy as fairly mixed. For example, the
decision to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC
was judged with some cynicism. The overall impression gained
from the survey data is that where South Africans do hold
opinions on foreign affairs, they tend to be complex and
sophisticated. Government policy is not merely accepted as
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given, necessarily correct or automatically in the national
interest. Both trade and human rights promotion, are seen as
equally important and South Afrtcans display a keen senSE: of
international moralism. (Markinor: 1997, p.8)
The importance South Africans attach to upholding moral values in foreign
policy is possibly linked to the nature of the South African democracy and
the character of President Mr ldela. Regarding the switch, one can
therefore expect that the South African public will weigh up the 'China'
decision in terms of both its morality and economic benefits for South
Africa.
Swift (1975:17), makes a strong case for the necessity of states to maintain
moral standards in international relations. He argues that national interest,
(forming the basis for foreign policy of states) should be invested with
individual moral values. "Thinking in terms of the individL.:.t1It becomes
natural to incorporate into decision making moral qualms" (Swift: 1975,
p.17).
Toma and Gorman (1991:139), argues that "there is ample evidence that
foreign policy makers, especially at the top of the organisational hierarchy,
use moral considerations in their deliber.st'ons. The Machiavellian maxim
"the end justifies the means"" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.139) poses a
related problem. In a democracy, frequent appllcation of the ends-justify -
the means doctrine can be both counterproductive in foreign policy and
damaging to the very foundations of the democratic system. The question
is, "Can a democracy relinquish certain operations ';hat sometimes require
immoral acts, even if it means sacrificing success for morality in foreign
policy?" (Toma and Gorman: 1991, p.139)
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2.6.4. The Hybrid Approach
The word 'hybrid' means a combination. The researcher is of the opinion
that the three models i.e., the Rational Actor Model, the Organisational
Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model are ",I! important
contributors to developing a holistic framework of analysis for decision
making in general and with respect to the 'China' decision in particular.
The 'Hybrid' approach, according to this view, will then incorporate into its
framework elements from all three the models. For example, to explain
what happens within the organisation between individuals who are involved
in the decision making process, one may expect different views. That is,
one person may be pro People's Republic of China whilst the other may be
pro Republic of China. Conflict may arise between these two people's
views. This conflict is recoqnised as an aspect in decision making by the
Bureaucratic Politics model. To resolve this conflict both people can agree
to go t0 the rulebook or to follow the example of international precedent on
the issue.
Both these 'solutions' are Organisational Process model 'solutions'. The two
people, (bureaucrats) could have been part of a strategic, pre-planned and
well-coordinated management process, a feature of the Rational Actor
model. This example shows that it is not prudent to assume that the three
models are mutually exclusive. Whilst they are distinct from each other, and
each has its own strengths and weakness, if used together, the strengths
the one have may make up for the weaknesses of the other models. Thus a
possibility exists that all three models can be used in a unique combination
to provide a satisfactory framework of analysis for the 'China' decision. The
hybrid approach represents this unique combination.
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2.7. Decision Making Tools
Frei and Ruloff (1989) examine the various ways used in foreign policy
analysis to conduct planning and assess risks. They look at decision trees,
decisional matrices, statistical analysis, trend analysis and time series
analysis. They illustrate how decision trees can be used as a tool to
investigate options and possible outcomes. "The objective of using the
structured decls'on tree is to minimise the inclination to overlook and
neglect some option and related outcome. The more detailed and carefully
drafted a decision tree, the greater the advantage of making clear and
purposeful selections" (Frei and Ruloff: 1989, p.201).
Of relevance to this research, was the need to determine whether the
various departments use different decision making tools. Using different
decision making tools may have lead to differing perspectives developing
on the matter being addressed. For the same reason, it was important to
ascertain if role players at the different power levels have used different
decision making tools.
2.8. Summary of literature
This literature review explains the background and theoretical
underpinnings of the research. The broad context (government's pclicy
mai<ing), narrow context (foreign policy making), and specific context
(decision making) have been defined and explained. The specific decision
making models bebg the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process
model, the Bureaucratic Politics models, and the hybrid approach have
been explained.
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Decision making tools and how the use of different tools may lead to
different approaches to the same problem have been explained. The role
and influence of the hierarchy of powerful role players (inner ring, second
riny and outer ring) have also been explored. Three decision making
prucess models and the importance of the hybrid approach were explained.
These models provide tile theoretical framework for the alysis of the
'China' decision.
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSITIONS
3.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the theory explained in chapter two
to the following research problem:
How did the South African government manage the decision making
process regarding the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of
China?
This chapter analyses each of the models in turn to identify what features
they have and what one could expect if one applied them to the above
mentioned problem statement. The assumption being that if most of the
elements of the particular model was operative in the 'China' decision, the
outcomes explained under the application could then be expected from the
interviewee's responses. Completing the process for each of the models
allowed the researcher to derive the proposition. The proposition is the
approach expected to be operative in the 'China' decision.
The researcher identified six themes, (extracted from many authors for
example Toma and Gorman: '1991; Hilsman et. al. 1993; Allison: 1969 and
an understandln., of "",c;i should be the basis of comparing the models)
which toqetner p: 'vk.-:lei the framework within wh'oh to analyse each model.
The thon ie·; are:
1. Nature of governance,
2. Basis of decisions,
3. Climate or context of decision,
4. Kind of decision,
5. Decision tool used and
6. Management
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Essentially each model provides different answers (elements) to the
questions put to it by the themes.
Matrix1: Matrix of Themes and Rational Actor Model
Themes Rational Actor Model
Nature of governance .. United purposive strategists
who are rational actors /
individuals
• No ciissent among policy
makers
Basis of decls'ons • Rational steps
• National interest which means
that the goal is maximisation of
economic benefits/ security
/power
Climate/context of decision • No uncertainty and full
information
" Cultural and ideological
differences causes no
differences in interpretation
Kind of decision • Consensus on maximising
alternative
Decision tool used .. Cost benefit analysis
Management • Manager: Combined efforts of
rational policy making group
• Management process: Pre~
arranged, strategically planned
process
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Applying the themes to the rational actor model, the above result was
obtained (Torna and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman et.al: 1993; Allison: 1969).
After applying the themes to the organisational process model, the following
result was obtained:
Matrix 2: Matrix of Themes and Organisational Process. "odel
Themes Organisational Process Model
Nature of governance 8 Conglomerate of loosely allied
organisations
• Standardised individual behaviour
II Predictable behaviour
co Bureaucratic nature
Decision are based on • Rules
" Precedent
Context I climate of decision • Certainty created by standard
operating procedures
Kind of decision til Routine
Decision tool used • Standardised rule making
Manaqeroent f) Manager: Rulebook
.. Management of process: Standard
organisational procedures
(Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsmar. et.al: 1993; Allison: 1969)
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When applying the themes to the bureaucratic politics model, the following
result was obtained:
Matrix 3: Matrix of Themes and Bureaucratic Politics Model
Themes Bureaucratic Politics Model
Nature of governance Lack of consensus among bureaucrats
Different actors exist
Actors with different roles
Actors with different power and influence
according to position power
Hierarchy of power
Basis of decisions Bureaucratic power and influence
Climate I context of decision Minima! role for external influences from
politicians or extra parliamentary groups
I
and public opinion
Kind of decision Deal
Decision tool used Bargaining
Management Manager: Bureaucrat
Management of process: Resultant of
bureaucratic politicking
(Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman Et. al: 1993; Allison: 1969)
3.2. Analysis of models
The three decision making process models have different strengths and
weaknesses. Some elements within each of the decision making models
illuminate the research problem, whereas other elements are completely
inapplicable to analysing the research problem.
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3.3. The Rational Actor Model
If the rational actor model is operative in this situatior :r means that the
assumptions of the model will be reflected in the set of results obtained
from the interviews.
Therefore one expect the following outcomes under each of the six
themes:
3.3.1. Nature of Governance
• The interviewees should identify that government actually consists of united
purposive strategists, who are all rational actors and therefore have no
disagreement about policy. All relevant government structures (i.e.
Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry, The
Defence Ministry, and National Intelligence; and institutions like the
President's office, the deputy president's office, the parliamentary portfolio
committee on foreign affairs, the parliamentary portfolio committee on trade
and industry) should have one purpose. Each individual within those
structures should subscribe to the same purpose, have the same
understanding of the issue and therefore come to the same conclusion, as
other individuals in the same structures.
3.3.2. Basis of decision making
This assumes that the basis of the analysis of the situation is the same- i.e.
rational steps get taken to arrive at what the rnaxlrnisinq alternative is. This
means that:
o All players must identify national interest of South Africa as the basis for the
decision
o All players should agree on exactly what the national interest of South
Africa is on the 'China' decision. This could be defined in terms of
economics (trade and investment) power and security (military) international
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standing of South Africa (on bodies like the United Nations (UN),
Organisation for African Unity (OAU)) For example:
• South Africa wants to be elected to represent Africa on the United Nations
Security Council (in future), so it needs the vote of the People's Republic of
China to realise its future international aspirations.
• South Africa recently gained membership of the OAU, SADC, the NAM etc.
These organisations recognise the People's Republic of China and not the
Republic of China. Therefore South Africa is out of step with the rest of the
international bodies it sits on.
• At present, South Africa's trade with the People's Republic of China and
Hong Kong combined outstrips its trade with the Republic of China. The
trade between South Africa and the People's Republic of China is growing
at a higher rate than the trade with the Republic of China. The People's
Republic of China is a greater potential market for South African products
than the Republic of China.
• The fact that Hong Kong reverted to the People's Republic of China on 151
July 1997, meant that South Africa had to recognise tile People's Republic
of China not to loose the landing rights for SM, and risk negative impacts
on its trade with and through Hong Kong.
o then one can deduce that they will also agree on which choice is the best
choice.
If this scenario is true, it will mean that all players agree that South Africa
must switch to the People's Republic of China.
3.3.3. Climate or Context of the decision
The model assumes that full information exists and that there is no
uncertainty. Even if cultural and ideological differences do exist, they do not
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influer.ce individuals interpretation of the issue and H erefore no differences
in the interpretation of the issue at stake result.
The South African nation consists of people from different racial, cultural
and, political groups. Across the spectrum of organisations and institutions
dealing or influencing the 'China' decision, there is enormous diversity. For
example these structures include those with communist views, people with
capitalist views, Jifferent religious outlooks, academics, etc. Even within
organisations there are different ideological and political perspectives. If tl-e
model's assumption is correct it means that all these different kinds of
individuals, should still choose the People's Republic of China above the
Republic of China irrespective of their differences.
3,3.4. Kind of Decision
The model assumes that the kind of decision will be a consensus decision
based on agreement on the maximising alternative. On the 'China' decision
it means that all players should agree, that the South Africa should have
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. It should be a
consensus.
3.3.5. Decision Tool Used
The model assumes that cost benefit analysis should be used to weigh up
each alternative and to arrive at the maximising alternative. This means that
on the 'China' decision the players should have looked at the pro's and
con's of South Africa recognising the People's Republic of China and the
Republic of China. Then they should have weighed up the benefits derived
from each choice and compared it to the benefits derived from the other
choice. They should also have compared the "costs" what could be 'est by
South Africa if she choose the People's Republic of China and not the
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Republic cf China and vice versa. After doing this kind of "balance sheet",
the rnaxlrnlsinq alternative would then be crystallised. If the lntervlewees
state that cost benefit analysis or balance sheet analysis was used, or that
the decision was based on information/recommendations using this
decision making tool, then it means that the rational actor model's decision
making tool was use, to analyse the alternatives on the 'China' decision.
3.3.6. Management
The model assumes that the decision making group consists only of rational
actors. That is people who can clinically and objectively analyse the
situation and come up with the rational choice. There is no room for emouve
ties to a particular choice, frlendshlp with either the People's Rr public of
China or the Republic of China or any moral issues. It also assumes that
the decision making process was consciously managed in a step by step,
strategically pre-planned manner. In other words there is no room really for
an iterative process, for impuisiveness.
The models assumptions are correct on this element if:
e the interviewees can identify exactly who managed the process (person or
group)
GI state that they were required to attend an interdenartmental / interstructural
strategy meeting where tasks for each indlviduat or structure was worked
out and time limits set for feedback and reports
I) state that this initial strategy meeting was followed by a series of similar
meetings until eventually the maximising alternative was arrived at
• state that this maximising alternative was then just given to the President to
announce, which he than proceeded to do, without his personality or
preferences causing any impact
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The rational actor model purports to lead to "the implementation of well
calculated declslons" which is a s!tuation all decision-makers hope to
achieve. However, it is very difficult to behave in this rational way because
most decision-making environments in foreign affairs are imperfect. No one
can claim to have considered all the possibilities or maximised the goal with
the decision that gets taken eventually. Most decision-makers strive for
satisfactory, which is the alternative considered to be the best amongst all
the other alternatives. Those responsible for the decision, choose the
"satisfactory" alternative, (Dunn: 1994) because they think that it has the
least drawbacks for the particular situation. It is not a perfect alternative.
The rational actor model assumes that one policy making group makes the
declslon, Even though differences exist, these differences do not impact on
the final decision, which is a consensus decision.
3.4. The Organisational Process Model
If the orqantsatlonal process model is operative in this situation, it means
that the assumptions of the model will be reflected in the set of results
obtained from the interviews.
Therefore on:
3.4.1. Nature of Governance
The interviewees should identify that government actually consists of a
conglomerate of loosely allied organisations with a bureaucratic nature. All
relevant government structures form this conglomerate. They are the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Ministry of Defence, the National Intelligence Agency, the South Af can
Secret Service, institutions like the President's office, the Deputy
President's Office, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry.
Each of the parts of the conglomerate function as a bureaucracy. It would
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mean that .. 8 same procedure would be used to resolve any problem.
Whether it is the switch from the ROC to the PRC or deciding on the times
for lunch or the budget ~llocations. Comments about the individuals
employed in these organisations should provide evidence of the
standardised and predictable behaviour of these individuals. This would
mean that individuals use a set procedure to deal with any problem. For
instance, if it is procedure to wait for a request from the minister before any
research project is started, for example on the 'China' question, it means
that the desk officer will only follow this procedure. Even if he/she is asked
by sc..teone else to start investigations he/she will refuse 'because the set
procedure was not followed. Responses like 'I don't act on your instructions/
requests only on the minister's instructions', would be forthcoming. The
desk officer will also not initiate any project.
3.4.2. Basis of decisions
All decisions made will be done on the basis of rules or precedent. In this
case it would mean that the desk officer had to look up the rule on what
procedure should be followed if South Africa is faced with a situation where
it had to choose between two entities like the Republic of China and
People's Republic of China. If no rule existed, previous behaviour of the
organisation will be the next guideline. In the absence of both of these
guidelines the officer can then conclude that no decision can be made until
a rule exists, or precedent exists that can serve as the guideline. The
'problem' will then be referred to management with a recommendation that
a general rule get formulated to enable the solution of this problem and any
similar problem that may arise in future. This is used in court cases. Judges
41
make new rulings only in the absence of a rule or precedent. Judgement
then serves as the precedent for subsequent cases.
3.4.3. Climate or Context of Decisions
For this model the context/climate of the decision is certainty. This certainty
is created by the standard operating procedures. It is 'safe' to give the
decision to any employee because the employee will use the standard
procedures and irrespective ot who uses the rules the result will be the
same as long as the individual adheres to the rules. If there was a rule
stating that South Africa will never switch diplomatic ties from one entity to
the other, irrespective of whether the President had to apply the rule or a
secretary at DFA, it would have been impossible for South Africa to switch.
3.4.4. Kind of Decision
This model predicts that interviewees will classify the decision as a routine
decision. This kind of decision would then be handled in the same manner
as all other routine decisions, follow the same channels, take the same time
to be completed, etc.
3.4.5. Decision r';>o1
Standardised rules should be identified as the decision tool. The
interviewees should be able to point out a particular rule, or precedent. For
example, a rule that forbids a decision-maker to switch diplomatic
recognition from one entity to another can be used.
3.4.6. Management
• Managp.r
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In this model the 'manager' is the rulebook. Even if a senior manager want
to be innovative and use a different procedure or make a decision that suits
the situation, but is not catered for in the rulebook, such initiative will be
overruled by the rulebook. Sihe may even face disciplinary hearings
because slhe did not follow the rules.
• Management process
The management process is determined by a set of organisational
procedures. These steps must be followed. This is the case with budgets
and tenders. Quite rigid procedures exist to ensure that corruption is
minimized. For example in foreign policy decision making a set procedure
could make it impossible for anyone of the entities to have direct access to
the President to lobby him.
3.5. The Bureaucratic Politics Model
3.5.1. Nature of Governance
This model focuses on what goes on internally in government
organisations. Thus it sees that government consist of bureaucrats, these
bureaucrats do not agree with each other, i.e. there is a lack of consensus
among them. They are different actors with different roles, different power
and influence accordina to their position power and also a hierarchy of
power. If these elements or ':;!:J model is true, it means that interviewees
will be able to identify the different actors and the different roles t;ley played
according to the position power they have. In this kind of decision making
process information is power. For example the desk officer may influence
the decision by virtue of the fact that slhe has a wealth of information from
varied sources which gives himlher unique insights and facilitates his/her
ability to make recommendations. A different actor e.g. the director general
may develop other insights because he/she has access to classified
information or sit in meetings tn!::!tthe desk officer does not have access to.
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This makes it possible for different actors to play different roles according to
the insights they have developed. Position power also makes it possible for
some actors to have a veto right, to stop decisions from being taken or
being implemented, or to delay decisions. Thus the roles played by the
desk officer of information gathering on both the pros and con's of
recognising either the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China
can playa significant role. The minister by virtue of being the minister of
foreign affairs participated in a number of discussions on the issue, led a
delegation etc. These are the kinds of issues the interviewees would
identify if tile model were relevant.
3.5.2. Basis of decisions
The decisions would be based on bureauoratlc power and influence. It is
possible that the interviewees will mention that the position of power of a
particular individual ensured that the decision was taken. For example, if
the desk officer was pro Taiwan, his recommendation will be pro Taiwan
and if the minister and president only base their decision on this input then
the decision wi:! r -ro Taiwan.
3.5.3. Climate or Context of decision
Tile climate or context within which the decision is made is
interdepartmental conflict. That simply means that these different actors
have different views and each try to get his view accepted. Thus conflict
can arise between different actors. For example if two desk officers work on
this question and one is strongly pro Taiwan, whilst the other is strongly pro
People's Republic of China debate and conflict can arise.
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3.5.4. Kind of Decision
The model proposes that the kind of decision that emerges from this kind of
conflict is a deal. It can be that the one bureaucrat \ 'ecide to tone down
his views. So lets say the pro People's Republic of Chma view becomes the
recommendation. But in future, on an issue of Nigeria for example, the pro
Taiwan bureaucrat's view will be used as the recommendation.
3.5.5. Decision Tool
The tool used between the bureaucrats in this m .....,
settle the conflict by making a deal with each other.
bargaining. They
3.5.6. Management
According to this model the manager would be the bureaucrat. His/her
influence is so great that his superior's role is relegated to that of
rubberstamping the decisions s/he as bureaucrat took. This model
proposes that the management of the decision making process is actually
the resuit of bureaucratic politics. The process bureaucrats engage in,
including the debates and conflicts and the eventual deal becoming the
result of the whole process.
3.S. A Hybrid Approach
A hybrid approach would incoroorate elements of all the above. It does not
assume a perfect world where decisions, ::-Jromf;:Je on full information. It
accepts that at best satisfactory ceclsicns can Ot:! made, as a result of the
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uncertain, complex and transformational environment in which foreign
affairs decision making takes place in the world, South Africa and the
Department of Foreign Affairs. A Hybrid approach will be relevant if the
interviewees identify all three the other models as relevant to a particular
theme. For example if on the theme of the decision making tool, and the
theme of the management the Rational Actor model, the Organisational
Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model was fcund relevant the
hybrld approach wi!! be considered relevant. The point of the Hybrid
approach is t'iat it takes all the elements of the three models into account
Thus it is proposed that it is better able to address the complexity of the
decision making process on the 'China' decision. What is proposed
therefore, is that the hybrid model provides the satisfactory framework for
analysing the decision making process on the 'China' decision.
3.7.Proposition
Through a study of the decision making process the South African
government engaged in to decide that from January 1, 1998, South Africa
will have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and break
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the following proposition will
be tested:
A 'HYBRID APPROACH' provides the satisfactory framework of
analysis of how the South African government managed the
declslon-maklnq process regarding establishing diplomatic
relations with the People'sRepublic of China.
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3.8. Summary
This chapter states the proposition. This proposition was formulated after
examining the theory and applying it to the research problem.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to cover two important aspects of the report.
Firstly, a clear distinction is drawn between the unit of analysis and the
context of the research and secondly, the research methodology used is
described in detail and also justified.
4.2. Differentiation between Unit of Analysis and Context
4.2.1. Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis of the case study is the management of the decision
making process the South African government engaged in to decide to
recognise the People's Republic of China diplomatically.
4.2.2. Context
The broad context of the case study is policy making in government. The
narrow context of the case study is foreign policy making, targeting foreign
policy decision-making processes. The specific context of the case study is
the debate on whether the Republic of China or the Peoples Republic of
China should be recognised diplomatically by South Africa.
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4.3. Research Met~odology: Description and .lustiflcatlon
4.3.1. Case Study
According to Leedy (1993:p.1 ~QJ, all research methodology rests upon a
bedrock axiom, which is, "The nature of the ... problem for the research
dictate the research methodology." By examining the decision making
process that led to the decision by the South African government to switch
diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic
of China, the nature of the research problem 'tries to illuminate a decision.'
Schramm (in Yin 1994:22) provides the following definition of a case study
"the essence of a case study ... [is that ill tries to illuminate a decision" (Yin:
1994, p.22).
Yin (1994:29) explains that a how question is " likely to lead to the use of
case studies, histories and experiments". Experimental design is
inappropriate for this study because experiments require that the
investigator have substantial control over the behaviour of the respondents.
It is impossible for the investigator of this study to have any control over the
individuals involved in foreign policy decision making in South Africa.
Therefore the investigator chose a case study design because "the case
study is preferred ...when the r·~levant behaviors (sic) cannot be
manipulated."(Yin: 1989,p.19)
A history is also inappropriate because firstly, "Histories are the preferred
strategy when there is virtually no access or control". Before proceeding,
the investigator ensured that there is sufficient access to data and
individuals to successfully complete the study. The second reason why a
history is inappropriate is because "the case study is preferred in
examining contemporary events," (Yin: 1989,p.19). The decision central to
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this study, was am .ounced on 2ih ;Jovember 1996, which means that
contemporary events was examined.
The third reason why the history is inappropriate to this study, is the use of
multiple sources of evidence, both documents and interviews. Only the
case study design is appropriate because of the "case study's unique
'" ability to deal with a full variety of ev'uence - documents, ... interviews"
(Yin: 1989,p.19).
The case study method is appropriate when lnvestlqcrors desire to
a. "define topics broadly and not narrowly
b. cover contextual conditions and not just the phenomenon of study
c. and rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence" (Yin: 1S-), p. xi).
In this study each of the requirements outlined by Yin in the above q.iote is
applied. For example:
• This topic is not defined narrowly. Even though this research does focus
on a specific issue, i.e. the decision to establish diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China, it uses a broad definition of the decision
making process (defined above). If instead, a narrow definition of the
decision making process is used, the danger exists that the research will
be limited to such an extent that it may not be worth studying at all.
e The impact of the following important contextual conditions are
recognised and described in the research.
• Policy making in Government,
" Foreign Policy decision making in Government,
• the internal (political, economic etc.) developments within South
Africa,
• South Africa's changed role in the world arena,
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e The impact of International (foreign countries) influence on South
Africa
• South Africa's toreign policy objectives, interests, and economy
• The debate on which of the Republic of China or the People's
Republic of China should be recognised diplcmatically and the
reasons fo,' and against each,
• The research relies on two sources of evidence, interviews and
documents.
4.3.2. Justification of design as a single case study
This is a single case study, because it revolves around one decision the
South African government made regarding one of its foreign policy issues.
The use of the single case study design is necessary because "The single
case study is an appropriate design in testing a theory ... whether a theories
propositions are correct. .. or whether some alternative set of explanations
may be relevant." Yin ('1994:42) The objective of this single case study is to
assess whether a 'hybrid approach' is a satisfactory framework of analyses
of the foreign policy decision making process the South African government
engaged to decide which one of the " two Chinas " it will recognise
diplomatically.
It is an explanatory single case study because this question deals with
operational links traced over the time period 27th April 1994 to 31sl
December 1997, (Yin: 1989,p.18)
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4.4. Data Collection
4.4.1. Description
Each method's favoured data collection and analysis techniques also reflect
the IT .rthod's initial orientation and its assumptions about whether to follow
the rules of traditional scientific inquiry. The initial case study orientation is
toward multiple sources of evidence. The case study evaluation can
therefore include the use of documentary analysis; open and closed ended
interviews. (Yin 1993,p.67)
For this research, the primary source of data collection will be the interviews
based on open ended, semi structured questions. See appendix 2 for list of
semi structured questions. ThE: particular advantage of using this approach
is explained by Yin (1984:p.83), who states that case study interviews are
of an open-ended nature, in which an investigator can ask key respondents
for the facts of a matter as well as for the respondents' opinions about
events. In some situations, the investigator may even ask the respondent to
propose his or her personal insights into certain occurrences and may use
such propositions as the basis for further inquiry.
Therefore interviews with key people in the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Department of Trade and Industry, and other institutions of government
were done. Though the South African business community were not very
vocal in public on the issue, attempts were made to get a representative
view from the business community by interviewing Mr. P.J. Botha who is
presently employed by ABSA bank group. Besides his knowledge of the
historical developments on this decision, even prior to 1994, Mr. P.J. Botha
also serves as the chairman of the East Asia society, and interacts regularly
with South African businessmen on business interests in Asia. (See
appendix 3 for a full list of interviewees).
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Yin (1984:83) continues to caution the investigator against becoming too
dependent on a key informant, and advises the use of corroboratory
evidence to deal with th!" pitfall.
The secondary data was gleaned from administrative documents,
dlscusslon papers, journals, seminar papers and newspaper articles on the
Republic of China -People's Republic of China debate. This provided an
overview of related events and opinions and assisted in drawing up the
chronology in appendix 8. A database comprising of audio tapes of the
interviews, summary matrix of the interviews and documentation, were
compiled.
4.4.2. Justification of research questions
The focus of the research question does not iend itself to any quantitative
research methodology and statistical analysis. It does require
questionnaires to be done, but open ended and semi structured questions
appropriate for the research. See list of open ended questions in appendix
1. Appendix 2 show the appropriateness of the research questions by
"matching" the research questions to the various objectives. In this way, it is
ensured that the questions forming the bases for the unstructured
interviews resulted in reaching the stated objectives.
4.4.3. Justification of sample
The list of interviewees was compiled from looking at who deals with the
decision making on the ROC -PRC question for South Africa. According to
the classification used by Hilsman (1993:p.ix), they can be classified as
inner ring; (president and departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and
Industry) second ring (interest groups) and outer ring/periphery (public
opinion, media).
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This is why the list includes formal institutions dealing with government
decision making and implementation, as well as recognising the influence of
political parties, and information gathered by academics and the views of
the public as presented in the media. In the case of the media, a summary
of the views expressed in various articles will be used. Thus each
interviewee selected on the list is there because of his/her government
position, or the role he/she played with respect to deciding on and or
influencing the decision making regarding the diplomatic recognition of the
People's Republic of China.
4.5. Data Analysis
The data is analysed in the following way:
The themes characterisin., each of the decision-making models are isolated
in appendix 4. To ensure comparability, the themes isolated answer the
following six questions for each model.
• What was the nature of governance?
flI What were decisions based on?
• In which climate or context were decisions made?
• What kind of cecision was made?
• Which decision tool was used?
• Management
" Which "entity" was the manager?
I> Which management process was used? or How was it managed?
The Appendix 9 matches the six themes to the secondary objectives of the
research. As explained earlier the questions, asked are matched to the
secondary objectives in Appendix 2. This ensures that both the questions
and the research themes are linked with the secondary objectives. It
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increases the possibility that the responses to the questions will enable to
researcher to reach the research objective. It also means that the
responses matched to the elements of the themes will ensure that the
research objective is reached.
Each model provides a unique solution to the above mentioned six critical
issues. These are the elements, which the researcher will look for in the
interviewee's responses. Each interviewee has his/her own understanding
of how these questions was handled in the decision making process. These
answers were ticked off against the element of the model it.resembles most
closely. Thus a matrix of questions on the Y-axis, the models on the X-axis,
was compiled. (Appendix 6, 7 and 8) The elements the interviewees
identify, are indicated by a numerical number showing the place on the tape
where the view is expressed. This is done in order to make it easier to
verify. The matrix (appendix 6, 7 & 8) also provides a summary of the
results of the interviews.
To isolate the elements identified by each interviewee, the following
process was used.
• To get a sense of the whole, the investigator listened to each audio
taped interview.
• The process was started with the most interesting interview, the one
with Chris Landsberg, Care was taken to focue on both the literal
meanings and the underlying meanings contained in the data.
_. The data was coded according to the codes given to the elements
identified in appendix 4.
" Each interview's results were written in the matrix.
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4.6. Ensuring validity and reliability
The use of "multiple sources of evidence (interviews and documents)",
establishment or a "chain of evidence", and key informant review of the draft
case study report, will assist to ensure construct validity. I will not address
internal validity because "internal validity is a concern only for causal or
explanatory studies where the investigator is trying to determine whether
event x led to event y." (Yin: 1989, p.43) As explained elsewhere (in the
section on delimitation's), this study does not examine causality. External
validity will be obtained by "analytical generalization" (Yin: 1989, p.43)
where the results of the study will be generalised to the broader decision
making theory.
4.7. Limitations of the research
The research does not make a case as to whether the recognition of ROC
or the PRC was the best choice for South Africa. Although it draws on
research of the pros and cons of South Africa choosing one or the other, it
does not focus on that aspect. It also does not focus on the general set of
problems a government can experience in making policy. This research
does 110t attempt to develop an understanding of international relations
between nation states. Therefore the international relations theory and
paradigms described so succinctly by McGowan (1995: p7-27), was not
reviewed in this research. The theory underpinning the research centres on
decision-making theory or frameworks of analysis. A further limitation of the
research is a limitation related to the research methodology. The case study
methodology makes extrapolation difficult (Yin: 1994). Therefore a limitation
of this research was the difficulty in extrapolating from the 'China' decision
to general foreign policy decision making in South Africa. Even though a
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chronology is included in appendix 8, this is not a historical report on how
the situation between the ROC and PRC developed, at what stage it is at
the moment and how this influences stability in the East Asia region.
Although only fourteen interviews were completed key players representing
a wide spectrum of organisations and institutions were interviewed (refer to
appendix 3). Another limitation was the time frame of the research. This
tirnefrar Ie excluded any decision made before 27 April 1994 and after 27
November 1997.
What is of essence in this research, is how the present South African
government managed the decision making process r3garding the diplomatic
recognition of the People's Republic of China. The time period of the
research is 27 April 1994 to 27 November 1996. On the 2ih April 1994, the
new government was voted into power and many observers expected it to
change foreign policy in general and in particular switch from the ROC to
the PRC. This research focus on the decision-making process for the
decision announced on the 2ih November 1997. Any decision made
outside these dates therefore falls outside of the scope of the research.
4.8. An exemplary case study
This research will attempt to follow Yin's (1984:140), characteristics of an
exemplary case study. These are:
€I The case study must be significant. This means that the case should be
of general public interest, which the Republic of China -People's
Republic of China issue is at the moment in South Afnca. Also the
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underlying issues, e.g. decision making, should be nationally important
in theoretical terms or in policy or practical terms.
o The case study must be complete. Which means that the boundaries of
the case, that is the distinction between the phenomenon being studied
and its context, are explicit.
• The complete case study should also demonstrate that the investigator
has extended exhaustive effort in collecting the relevant evidence.
9 The case study must consider alternative perspective i.e. alternative
interpretations should be advocated.
o The case study must display sufficient evidence so that the reader can
reach an independent judgement regarding the merits of the analysis.
• The case study must be composed in an engaging manner i.e. a clear
writing style that entices the reader to continue reading the case study
from beginning to end.
4.8. Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of how the
investigator goes about doing the research. A clear distinction is made
between the unit of analysis and the context of the research. Then the
investigator provides a step by step =xplanatlon of the research
methodology. A number of research methodologies can be used in
research. When one chooses a specific research methodology one does so
based on the "judgement calls" one make about the nature of the research
and the most effective, efficient and appropriate ways to reach the goal of
solving the research problem.
The term judgement call" refers to all those decisions ... that must be made
without the benefit of a fixed, "objective" rule that one can apply, with
precision, like a template ... ", ( McGrath, J.E., Martin, J., and Kulka, R.
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1982:p13) Because these judgement calls has a profound effect on the
solution of the research problem, "... the cumulative results of such
judgement calls often determine the outcome of research", (McGrath, J.E.,
et at..: 1982,p13), the investigator also justifies the choices made with
respect to the research design, data collection, data analysis and testing.
Based on research theory and the researcher's "judgements", the following
decisions wlth respect to the study was made:
• The researcr- methodology most applicable is the case study
methodology
• A single case study design is used
• Unstructured interviews will be done based on the questions outlined in
appendix 2.
" Each question was linked to each objective of the research, appendix 3,
to ensure that the objectives of the research will be achieved.
• The interviewees and documents were selected according to a set of
criteria outlined above.
• The data analysis will be conducted using coding and matrix
construction.
• Validity and reliability are addressed as outlined above
e This case study will aspire to emulate Yin's (1984:140), characteristics
of an exemplary case study.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSiS OF RESULTS
5.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the research.
As explained above, the primary source of the data was obtained from the
interviews. Fourteen people were interviewed. Their views are detailed
below. The quotations used were selected because they most clearly
expressed interviewees thinking on the theme. Appendix 7 is a synthetic
presentation of the views expressed in all the interviews as they relate to
the themes. This chapter looks at each of the following questions developed
from the six themes and presence the interviewees' responses.
• What was the nature of governance on the 'China' decision?
• On what was the 'China' decision based?
• In which climate or context was the 'China' decision made?
• What kind of decision was this 'China' decision?
• Which decision tool was used to make the 'China' decision?
D With regard to the management of the 'China' decision
.. Which entity was ~hemanager of the 'China' decision?
.. Which management process was used? or How was the 'China'
decision managed?
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5.2. Nature of governance:
5.2.1. Different actors exist
An important characteristic of the nature of governance on this issue was
that diffe.ent actors existed. The primary actor is the President, then the
deputy president, Department of Foreign Affairs, the parliamentary port folio
committee on foreign affairs, within government and outside of government
the SACP, COSATU, academics, NGO's like SAIIA. One interviewee
explained the existence of these different actors as follows:
Q ''There's several key overlapping forums and structures all of which have
a bite at and wrestle with foreign policy. First of all is the President, then
it's the deputy president, then it's the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Then there's the parliamentary portfolio committee, [which is] CI multi-
party structure but dominated by the African National Congress and the
SACP members. Then there's the other departments Finance, Home
Affairs Defence, many of them impact on Foreign Policy. Then there's
the alliance, the ANC first, with its Depart. lent of International Affairs.
[Then] the party [meaning SACP] which has been very active on foreign
policy and COSATU and the ANC Youth League" (Jeremy Cronin,
personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
5.2.2. Actors with different power and influence because of the
position they hold.
The roles of these actors are defined according to the positions they occupy
for example and they exert power and influence largely as a result of the
positions they occupy. For example one interviewee explained the power
and influence the desk officer had as follows:
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e "If the minister doesn't know much about an issue the desk officer will
supply a memorandum. The memorandum might amount to a
recommendation, and because the minister doesn't know much about
the issue and ... it's not a hot issue yet. the minister might just follow
that" (Raymond Buttner, personal communication, December 4th, 1996).
One interviewee points out that the influence of the desk officer extend
much further than the Department of Foreign Affairs itself because
structures outside government also utilise the memoranda prepared by the
desk officers at Department of Foreign Affairs to make decisions on foreign
affairs issues. "Even ANC comrades rely on briefing papers by I H~A "
(Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
5.2.3. Actors with different roles
The kind of decision that has to be made will also determine to a large
extent what leve! of government needs to bear responsibility for the
decision. For example according to two of the interviewees the roles of
actors depend on the level of the decision:
• "Very important decisions go to 'ire President, issues that are almost
important go to the minister and the deputy minister ... run of the mill
decisions are taken by the director's general and deputy director's
gene,al and other desk officers" (Raymond Suttner, personal
communication, December 4th, 1996).
.. "Routine decisions are taken by the Director General and Director's ...
line function ... diplomatic and high level decisions are taken by the
President and Cabinet" (Kate Kuper, personal communication,
November 28th, 1997).
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5.2.4. Competing centres of power (autonomous elite grollips inside
and outside of government; public opinion)
Tho actors who played different roles and exerted their influence based on
position power did not operata in isolation. They interacted with each other
in such a manner that they represented different elite groups or centres of
power that competed with each other.
Most respondents explained that the governance of this issue consisted of
competing centres of power that used their power to exert influence on the
decision. For example the influence exerted by the Department of Trade
and Industry, Department of Foreign Affairs inside government and
powerful elite groups within the National Exec '~:ive Committee of the African
National Congress, and the SACP ensured that a recommendation to
switch was forwarded to the President and to cabinet.
"The National Executive Committee (ANC), the Department of Trade and
Industry, the Economic Transformation Sub-committee of the National
Executive Committee (ANC) makes an input on foreign policy issues. Then
it gets taken to cabinet" (Blade Nzimande, personal communication,
December 3rd, 1996)
5.2.5. International opinion and precedent
Many interviewees referred to the importance of international precedence
on the governance of the 'China' decision. This indicates that international
opinion and precedence had an important impact on tne reasoning of
decision makers. Tile comments interviewees made were as follows:
• "International law [UN Resolution 2758 of 1971] prescribes and you
cannot get away from that therefore we followed lnternational
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precedence on this issue [the 'China' decision]" (Machiel van Niekerk,
personal communication, November ~Oth,1997).
• "The world reacts in a particular way towards Taiwan ... this [the
decision] would be consistent with world opinion" (Matthew Phosa,
personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).
The following evidence that the President discussed the matter with an
international opinion maker was founa :~ a Department of Foreign Affairs
document.
• "The President said that he had discussed the matter with Dr.
Boutros Boutros-Gali [on 28-04-1996]" (DFA document-minute of
president's meeting on 30104/1996 with Madame Wu, the PRC
minister of foreign trade and economic co-operation).
5.2.6. No dissent among policy makers
In general, at a political level, the majority of policy makers agreed on the
'China' decision. This comment was made by one of the interviewees,
indicating that even within opposition parties like the National Party, there
were a majority Of policy makers who agreed.
• "People like LeonWessels were already saying in 1994 we must go for
Mainland China. You'll find the views across parties. You did not hear
the National Party really making noise about it." (Matthew Phosa,
personal communication,March 22nd, 1997).
5.2.7. Lack of consensus among bureaucrats
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But at the level of the administration, although a majority supported the
'China' decision greater evidence was found of conflict and disagreement
amongst bureaucrats. One commentator (who did not want to be named)
admitted that there was considerable conflict within the Department of
Foreign Affairs on this issue. S/he stated that "there was a tug-of-war on
the 'China' decision. For those of us in the middle of it all, it was very
unpleasant"
One of the interviewees made a quite strong comment on the prevalence of
conflict and disagreement within the Department of Foreign Affairs.
• "The Department of Foreign Affairs [is a] pretty divided outfit at the
moment" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November 30th,
1997).
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5.2.8. Hierarchy of power
All government departments have a hierarchical structure. The
organograms given by interviewees working in government departments
illustrated this fact. See Department of Foreign Affairs example below.
President
D~puty President
President, Deputy President and
Cabinet
Minister: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
Mr. Alfred Nzo
Deputy' Minister: Mr. Aziz Pahad
I Director General: Mr. Rusty Evans
J
Deputy Director General: Ms. Mazibuko
(Asia and Middle East)
I
Director: Asia and Middle East
Mr. iaan Basson (Acting director)
I
Desk Officer: China
Mrs. Nina Human (Researcher)
Mr. Machiel van Niekerk (Deputy Director)
Mr. Mqawe Mtenjane (until November 1996)
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5.2.9. Conglomerate of loosely allied organisations
co One interviewee c! sarly identified the different government departments
and the way they w.:. ked Nith each other as a conglomerate of loosely
allied structures. She said that "This process started seriously by the
end of 1995. Department of Trade and Industry did eco .ornlc analysis
including inputs from industry, Department of Foreign Affairs political
analysis. The Portfolio committee engaged in the missions." (Kate
Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
5.3. Basis of decisions
5.3.1. National interest:
All the interviewees identified the national interest of South Africa on this
particular issue, as the basis for the decision. They mentioned the following
economic, political, long term, trade, dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese,
international standing of the PRC in the UN and the pressure of the Hong
Kong hand over as reasons for the switch:
Il "Realpolitik, others for economic and commercial reasons diplomatic
reasons, the other factor was the Security Council" (Jeremy Cronin,
personal communication, December 5th, 1996)
Il "The two very important points regarding China is the political angle.
China is a permanent member of the [UN] Security Council and you
cannot discard that very important [fact]. Secondly we were out of step
with the world. Thirdly trade has improved [with PRC]. Trade is of course
[very important] you are working with 1.2billion people- if you sell a
toothbrush to one [each] you're a billionaire" (Johan Kotze, personal
communication, January 16th, 1997)
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" "Long term interests of South Africa is the most important, not short
term. China doesn't have any [investment money in the short term] ...
but in the long term that economy is growing in a very serious way"
(Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).
s "We realised that what the Taiwanese were saying they were doing
... and what was actually he ling is two different things ... for
example Australia had a greater citrus quota than us, yet Australia did
not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We do not owe the
Taiwanese anything. Since 1989 one of my prime objectives was to
ensure that we could maintain our Hong Kong office post 1997. I was
pretty sure that we needed to talk to Beijing." (P.J. Botha, personal
communication, December 13th, 1996).
s "In its own national interest South Africa had little choice but to follow ...
all the major countries to recognise it [the PRe]. The immense growth
potential of the PRC and its political clout as a permanent member of
UN Security Council, ... and fears that the PRe would close our
valuable mission in Hong Kong when it takes over ... [made this]
decision necessary" The Star (November 29, p.16).
5.3.2. Consensus (reached after) crisis, conflict and debate
Many interviewees agreed that consensus was reached. But they explained
that the process to reach this consensus included discussions, debate,
conflict between those who had differing views on the matter and extensive
consultation.
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<lI "There were discussions within departments, across departments, with
ministers, with Members of Parliament, and Cabinet memoranda" (Kate
Kuper, personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
e "There was an open debate within the ANC about this" (Matthew Phosa,
personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).
e "There was a real and extensive debate within the party [SACP} ... that
was brought to a head in a focused debate that lasted a good hour and
a half, ... and different views were represented ... in the end we argued
for a one China policy [the People's Republic of China}. ... -Which was
accepted .... With that mandate, we engaged the ANC." (Jeremy Cronin,
personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
e 'Yes, we consulted. It is the policy of the department (DFA) to consult.
As recently as last week we had a wor'cshop with various academics ...
people from SAIIA, Centre for policy studies ... on foreign policy making.
On this [the 'China' decision] we also consulted with a wide range of
people inside and outside of government"(laan Basson, personal
communication, November 29th, 1996).
One interviewee explained that the decision making process includes
negotiating of the recommendations with other political parties. "[it is] also
negotiated with other parties" (Blade Nzimande, personal communication,
December 3rd, 1996). This consultation and negotiations seems to indicate
that a democratic process was used to arrive at the recommendation.
"then the ANC might find other opposition parties so opposed to it then they
will have to renegotiate ... The information that leads to that [the decision]
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comes from a whole variety of places. Like. The presidency itself does play
a role."
5.3.3. lnformaiion gathering (including information on international
precedence)
Most interviewees stated that information gathering does take place,
• "There were information gathering debates within organisations and
recommendations by organisations." (Kate Kuper, personal
communication, November 28th, 1997).
• "DFA prepares information and the missions (to PRC and ROC), also
generated information." (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication,
December 5th, 1996).
• One interviewee questioned whether this information was used to make
decisions.
"The fact of the matter is that information gets cornpned and filtered
through ... but there is no guarantee that that information does ever impact
on a decision. The information from Asia over the last two years convinced
the Department of Foreign Affairs ... to go for the mainland. However, the
President just could not be both=red by that kind of analysis because of his
own view that Taiwan was the most important one" (Chris Landsberg,
personal communication, November 28th, 1996).
The information gathered includes information on international precedents
on the issue
• "We followed the precedence of other countries" (Machiel van Niekerk,
personal communication, November 20th, 1997).
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5.4. Climate I Context of decision:
5.4.1. No uncertainty and full information
One interviewee explained that the president understood the issues
because he had many and varied inputs on the matter.
• "The President has understood the issues very well for a long time .
and a number of reports has gone to him, a number of memoranda .
probably from the Department of Fcreiqn Affairs, from the delegation
that went to Beijing and Taipei, I myself have written at least two
memoranda to him ... representing ANC structures, so he's had input
from a variety of sources" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication,
December 4th, 1996).
5.4.2. Cultural and ideological differences causes no differences in
interpretation
One interviewee explained that ideological differences among political
parties did not prevent a majority consensus across party political lines that
the People's Republic of China must be recognised.
• "You'll find the views [that South Africa must recognise the PRC] across
parties" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, Marcil 22nd, 1997).
5.4.3. Interdepartmental conflict I debate
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One interviewee made a strong statement to explain the extent of conflict
within the Department of Foreign Affairs on this issue. He said that
• "Department of Foreign Affairs Is divided" (Rocky Williams, personal
communication, November 30th, 1997).
Although other interviewees did not put is so strongly, they explain that the
debate within the organisations were serious and intense indicating that the
conflict on this issue extended across organisations.
• "There were ... debates within organisations" (Kate Kuper, personal
communication, November 28th, 1997).
• "We debated quite intensely at a central committee level [SACP], and
even some of the members of the central committee believed that we
should pursue a two China policy ... it is not a straight forward issue"
(Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996)
5.4.4. Minimal role for external influences from politicians or extra-
parliamentary groups and public opinion
One interviewee expiained that a political and parliamentary structure had a
minimal role despite the fact that rules were made to prevent this from
happening. He describes the lack of interaction between the bureaucracy
and the representatives of the electorate in parliament.
• "We have the agreement of parliament .. , to increase the role of
committees ... there are rules in place ... but its very difficult to translate
those rules It ; iJ orocess whereby a parliamentary committee makes a
definite lr :ltt in terms of foreign policy making. In order to make a
contribution to foreign policy making we need information. Information is
often supplied after a decision was made, so we don't have the
opportunity to make a contribution before the decision i~ made .... How
do you get the Department of Foreign Affairs, the minister of foreign
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affairs ... to give the foreign affairs committee the opportunity to make
such input. To seek our advice on important issues- they seek our
advice on unimportant issues. ... so these are '" the factors where I
don't feel that we as a committee are very successful. We get briefings
on some issues, we sometimes make recommendations but we don't
really have an ongoing relationship with the department of foreign affairs
which is constructive" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication,
December 4th, 1996).
5.4.5. Minimal role played by some government structures and
bureaucrats. Greater role played by certain government structures
and individuals, political allies, and civil society.
Some interviewees felt that a political organisation outside of government
e.g. the SACP played an important role,
• "The party [SACP] is very active on foreign policy issues. We stated that
that [the one China policy] was our policy and we will seek to influence
the mC'/Q"YJentand government. We engaged the African National
Congr vitI! that mandate [one China policy]. The party decision
was ..1-1'395,and end 1995 was the ANC decision ... "(Jeremy
Cr- ersonal communication, December 5th, 1996).
Whilst (J( H31' interviewees felt that the Department of Foreign Affairs played
a less important role. For example:
• "Department of Foreign Affairs really just tender ... advice ... if and
when they ... get [an opportunity to provide] input." (Rocky Williams,
personal communication, November 30th, 1997).
• "Our ro'e is advisor. Policy is made at that level [cabinet]. We're not
involved on the timing ... how everything came together. We put forward
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the information, then they decide on the basis of that information" (Iaan
Basson, personal cornmur ication, November 29th, 1996).
5.4.6. Uncertainty, risk, secrecy, imperfections and confusions
Many interviewees identified uncertainty and secrecy on especially the
timing of the announcement. For example on the timing of the
announcement interviewees responded as follows:
• "I'm led to believe by very senior members in the Asian department that
they were taken by surprise, ... they were not told ... as much as we all
WEre taken by surprise so were members in government taken by
surprise ... " (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November
28th, 1996).
• "But this is often the case you know, decisions are mad= at cabinet level
we don't know when its going to happen ... I'm not reall, ,a position [to
comment on the reasons for the timing]" (Iaan Basson, personal
communication, November 29th, 1996).
• "I'd be speculating, I don't know, I don't know. I don ( know if Thabo
Mbeki was involved ... [in deciding on the timing of the decision] " (P.J.
Botha, personal cornmur., ~dtion, December 13th, 1896).
5.4.7. Pressures from a number of competing interest groups
Most interviewees indicated that competing interest groups made input.
• "There are various organs of civil society that now make input on foreign
policy issues ... like SACOB ... there are COSATU, SACP, Anc. There
are particular interest groups for example ... environmental groups,
lawyere for human rights, on China Taiwan individual actors have made
input e.g. Greg Mills of SAIIA, Themba Sono, John Daniels, Deon
Geldenhuys, Peter Vale, myself' (Raymond Suttner, personal
communication, December 4th, 1996).
5.S. Kind of Decision
Most interviewees agreed that it was a personal decision by the President.
E.g.: " it was a personal decision and not a well thought out decision based
on proper analysis" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November
28th, 1996).
The differences among the interviewees 'elated to the characterisation of
the decision. For example one called it "an I, "'rmed and practical decision"
(Nltesh Dullabh, personal communication, December 4th, 1996), another
called it "unstrategic, emotive, arbitrary timing" (Kate Kuper, personal
communication, November 28th, 1997), yet another called it a principled
decision. "It's a principle of the ANC .. to have diplomatic relations with the
PRC" (Raymond Suttner, personal corurnunlcatlon, December 4th, 1996).
Jeremy Cronin (personal comrnunlcatlon, December 5th, 1996), called it
"Realpolitik".
One interviewee pointed out the almost complete agreement (consensus)
on the maximising alternative. For example, "On the China thing Thabo,
and the departrnent the DIA and therefore the ministry all agreed it was
really Madiba and one or two individuals in the ANC who disagreed"
(Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
5.6. Decision tool used:
CIl To arrive at the recommendations:
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Some interviewees clearly stated that the Department of Trade and Industry
used cost benefit analysis to arrive at the recommendations.
• "The Department of Trade and Industry used cost benefit analysis in
terms of quantitative and qualitative elements" (Kate Kuper, personal
communication, November 28th, 1997).
• "Department of Trade and Industry resorts to cost benefit Department
of Trade and Industry works on maximisation of returns Department
of Foreign Affairs? I doubt [if they use any tool]" (Chris Landsberg,
personal communication, November 28th, 1996).
Considering the Department of Foreign Affairs, some questioned whether
the Department of Foreign Affairs used any tool at all
e "very adhoc decision making process no tool used, there is a lack of a
tool in Foreign Affairs" (Rocky Williams, personal communication,
November 30th, 1997).
Whilst one interviewee explained that the Department of Foreign Affairs
used a balance sheet approach.
• "On the China issue -ROC issue ... foreign affairs did a balance sheet
... weighed up our interests in terms of our relationships with the
mainland and ... the same with the ROC" (P.J. Botha, personal
cornrnunication, December 13th, 1996).
e To arrive at the decision:
Some interviewees believe that Presidential decree / power was used as
the decision making tool.
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• "The presidency itself does play c role because certain questions are
very sensitive they have got actually to have the stamp of the President"
(Blade Nzimande, personal communication, December 3rd, 1996).
• "At the end of the day it is presidency decision making in Foreign Policy.
It's the President not only deciding on foreign policy but deciding when,
where, how" (Chris Landsberg, personal comrnunicatlor, November
28th, 1996).
5.7. Management
5.7.1. Manager.
Some interviewees strongly believe that the President is South Africa's
Foreign policy manager e.g.:
"It is not the Department of Foreign Affairs. It's the President ... it was
Mandela doing his own thing" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication,
November zs", 1996).
"In the parliamentary sphere this was recognised that this was very much
an executive decision" (Rob Davies, personal communication, February,
18th, 1997).
"It was executive action by the President" (Matthews Phosa, personal
communication, March 22nd, 199"1).
"The President" [is the decision maker in Foreign Policy] (P.J. Botha,
persona! communication, December 13th, 1996).
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'The President said that the majority of the leadership of the ANC (not just
CP or COSATU), were in favour of establishing relations with China "now".
[but] that he had been more cautious, he had asked ',;s comrades to
"handle this cautiously""(Department of Foreign Affairs document. Minutes
of President Mandala's meeting with Madame Wu.
One interviewee gave equal Importance to the President and deputy
president as joint managers e.g.:
"The most important personalities would be Madiba and Thabo" (Jeremy
Cronin, personal communication, December, 5th, 1996).
Whilst others downplay the role of the President For example:
"The Pre' ient was following a decision of the NEC [National Executive
Council (i ,\lC)] of about a year ago, ." the President was merely deciding
on the timing" (Raymond Suttner, personal communication, December 4th,
1996).
"The President acted on the recommendation of Foreign Affairs, but when it
comes to the timing of the decision, .. , the timing was that of the President.
... And when it comes to who should know about it before the public
announcement [the Presidentj decided" (Joel Ntshitenze, personal
communication, November 26th, 1997).
One interviewee provided the foilowing reason why the President was the
manager of foreign policy in South Africa:
"The reason why Mandela is because of his big personality, with a big aura,
everybody just thinks his great you don't tread on his turf you just believe
everything he says" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November
28th, 1996).
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"Due to his powerful personality, president Mandela plays a large role in
determining South Africa's foreign policy orientation" (van Niewkerk: 1996,
p.3).
5.7.2. Management of process:
One interviewee 'admitted' that the process was not managed within the
Department of Foreign Affairs. For example:
"The Department of Foreign Affairs did not manage the process, the
management was done outside of the department (DFA)" (Machiel van
Niekerk, personal communication, November zo", 1997).
Another interviewee explained the reality of the impact of the President's
personality on the management process. For example:
"The reality is that the personality at Mandela looms quite strongly on some
issues and on this one it has, even in the flip-flops the.' had something to do
with Mandela's personality itself. It is a part of the explanation for how the
policy making work. Its Mandela's personality. !t'~ a real reality in this
situation. So you can ha. ) formal decisions which Impact on the process
but how they spin out has something to do with [his] personality" (Jeremy
Cronin, personal communication, December 5th, 1996).
Most of the interviewees felt that the process of foreign policy decision
making was badly managed. Both in general and on this case in particular.
For example:
"I don't think that there is proper coordinated, structured decision making. It
is not well thought out and to the extent that it is thought out it is the
President's thinking. When it comes to China-Taiwan it's the President"
(Chris Landsberg, November, 11th, 1996).
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"It worked in a very erratic manner ... A lot of it depends on the whim of the
President" (Rocky Williams, persona: communication, November 30th,
1997).
"Its arbitrary ... there is no specific process, there is consultation,
information gathering and a decision by the President" (Kate Kuper.
personal communication, November 28th, 1997).
"It is not a planned process, it is an accidental process, you simply muddle
through foreign policy" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication,
November 28th, 1996).
"CICIR (China Institute for Contemporary International Relations) officials
during the meetir.g were also outspokenly critical of South Africa's roreinq
policy on the PRC and ROC and referred to the many conflicting and even
contradictory statements. '" They also posed the question as to who is in
charge of and who takes decisions on South Africa's relations with the
People's Republic of China" (OFA document: message received from
mission in Beijing, September,1996).
The management process is characterised as
~ individualistic e.g.:
"Crucially individualistic and personalised. highly personalised style of
forelcn policy [management]" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication.
November 2bth, 1996).
• impulsive
"I think that the President is very impulsive. He makes decisions to the
outside world and they (Department of Foreign Affairs) are left to pick up
the pieces after he's made these decisions '" he literally wakes up one
morning and makes the announcement ... like the Libyan thing .., the
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Indonesian thing" (Rocky Williams, personal communication, November
30th, 1997).
5.8. Summary
This chapter presented the results of the research. Many interviewees
identified elements from the Rational Actor Model and the Bureaucratic
Politics Model. A few interviewees identified elements from the
Organisational Process Model. The research results show that the
overriding influence that President Mandela had on the management of the
decision making process and the implementation of the decision indicates
that none of the models nor the hybrid approach, provide a satisfactory
framework of analysis.
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The following matrix is a synopsis of the results.
Matrix 4: MATRIX OF RESULTS: THEMES AND MODELS
Themes Rational Organisational Bureaucratic Hybrid M1+
Actor- Process-Model 2 Politics-Model3 M2+M3
Model 1
Theme 1: Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevant
Nature of
Governance
Theme 2; Relevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Basis of
decisions
Theme 3: Very Irrelevant Very relevant Irrelevant
Climate I relevant
Context of
Decision
Theme 4: Kind Relevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
of Decision
Irrelevanr-Theme 5: Relevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Decision Tool
Used
Theme 6: Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Management
Manager:-
Management
Process»
Key to matrix: Irrelevant: none of the interviewees support any of the
elements of this theme for this model; Relevant: One or two of the
interviewees support elements of this theme for this model; Very relevant:
Most of the interviewees support the elements of this theme for this model
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This matrix shows how relevant the models were in relation to the themes.
For example, The Rational Actor model (model 1) is relevant for the nature
of governance (Theme 1). This means that one or two of the interviewees
described the nature of the governance for the 'China' decision as
characterised by no dissent among policy makers and as consisting of
united purposive strategists who are rational actors I individuals (the
elements of the Rational Actor model). The Rational Actor model, the
Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model are
irrelevant for Management: the manager (Theme 6).
This means that none of the interviewees identified the manager as a
bureaucrat or a rulebook or a rational policy making group working in a
combined coordinated way. Rather the manager is identified as the
President precisely because he made the final decision and he had the final
say on the 'China' issue. The researcher used the term very relevant to
indicate that more than two interviewees expressed the same opinion. The
hybrid approach is marked irrelevant for all the themes. The reason is that
for the hybrid approach to be relevant, the Rational Actor model, the
Organisational Process model and the Bureaucratic Politics model must be
relevant for a particular theme. On only one of the six themes were all three
the models identified as relevant. On the other five themes the hybrid
approach were identified as irrelevant.
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CHAPTER 6: INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
-----------------~,- -----
6.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the results presented in chapter
five. The .elevance of each of the theoretical models and the hybrid
approach is assessed then the overall interp retation of results is given.
Statement of result: l\ usive evidence was found to substantiate the
proposition that on all stx themes, a combination of the three models, a
Hybrid approach, provide the satisfactory framework of analysis of the
decision making process on the 'China' decision.
Rational Actor model
On the 'China' decision the facts available contradict many of the Rational
Actor model's assumptions. The differences between the different actors in
this debate, led to differences of opinion on which one of the People's
Republic of China or the Republic of China should be recognised. Even
though there eventually was consensus on the fact that South Africa should
switch and recognise the PRC and not the ROC, differences of opinion
were evident in most of the structures and institutions that dealt with the
issue directly and even indirectly. Some academics argued strongly that
diplomatic recognition should remain with the Republic of China (Themba
Sono), whilst others (Greg Mills), believed that diplomatic recognition of the
People's Republic of China was the best alternative. Within the
parliamentary portfolio commi+ae, the African National Congress, the
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National Executive Council (ANC), the Department of Foreign Affairs and
many other structures, most individuals agreed to switch to the PRC, but
some still held the view that the status quo should remain.
The rational actor model is not able to adequately explain the decision
making process used by the South African government in the diplomatic
recognition debate on the 'China' decision, because many of the
assumptions of the rational actor model is not applicable.
Organisational Process Model
One element of the Organisational Process model's definition of the nature
of governance is that government consists of a conglomeration of loosely
allied organisations. The interaction between the various government
departments on the 'China' decision was evidence of this fact. The
organisational process model relies on rules and precedents. This model's
reliance on rules, makes it a less adequate framework of analysis in
understanding tile decision making process on the 'China' decision. This
kind of problem is too complex and dynamic for sensible rules that are
inherently standarr'' sed, There has been no precedent in the history of
South Africa, and no rules were written on how to handle tl-Jis kind of
situation. International precedent could be used as an example Yet the
conditions prevailing now are different from the conditions prevailing when a
number of other countries took the decision to switch to the People's
Republic of China. The specific choices each of these countries made, (who
did switch from the Republic of China to the Peop s's Republic of China)
also varies substantially from each other. The examples provided also
shows that the model in itself may be too rigid. A president cannot lead
unless he is allowed a high level of flexibility. Cabinet must have the
flexibility to access the evidence and information and according to the
definition of South Africa's national interest at the time, make a decision.
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That ::loes not mean that the President and cabinet will have Carte blanche,
the constitution does provide constraints within which both the President
and cabinet must govern.
Bureaucratic Politics
The bureaucratic politics model has the strength of being able to explain the
differences of opinion amongst the different departments, and different
actors in government. Some telt that South Africa should remain with the
status quo (Republic of China), others felt that the sooner South Africa
establishes diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China, the better.
However, this model excludes the role played by outsiders (those not part
of the bureaucracy), assumes less influence from the politicians on the
decision and assumes that only from the interdepartmental and
"intrabureaucratic" (Toma and Gorman: 191, p.136) tug -of -war, foreign
policy decisions get made.
The evidence in Sou!') I'frica on the 'Chlna' decision seems to contradict
this view. Polltlcians (President Mandela, and Alfred Nzo) did play a
significant role, as well as outside parties, like academics (through
conferences and numerous discussion documents) promoting either the
Republic of China or the People's Republic of China or dual recoqnitlcn,
Although there was strong evidence of an "intrabureaucratic" (Toma and
Gorman: 191, p.136) tug -of -war, this was not the over riding influence. The
overriding influence on this foreign pollcy decision was the personality and
leadership style of the President.
A Hybrid approach
On the theme of the nature of governance on the 'China' decision it can be
deduced that:
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., There was conflict amongst the different actors. Actors expressed
con;jicting views in the media. Thus this element of the bureaucratic
politics model can prove to be applicable for the 'China' decision.
8 The decision was according to the President's press statement taken
because of South Africa's national interests. This is an element from the
rational actor model. If the results concur, it means that this element of
the rational actor model contribute to the understanding of the issue .
., Different government departments were involved in the compiling of
data. At least two departments definitely co-operated on the 'China'
decision. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of
Trade and Industry played significant roles. This means that government
does consist of a conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, which is
an element proposed by the organisational process model under the
nature of governance.
Therefore on the theme of the nature of ~overnance a :,ybrid approach is
relevant. But on the other five themes one or more of the organisational
process model or the bureaucratic politics model c r the rational actor model
is irrelevant. Therefore on these five themes a h, jrid approach is not
relevant. In finding of the research is that a hybrid approach does not
provide a satisfactory framework for analysis of the 'China' decision.
6.2. Interpretation
The decision making process on the 'China' decision had two phases
Phase 1: Arriving at the Recommendations
Phase 2: Arriving at the Announcement
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This above-mentioned result makes it necessary for the researcher to
clarify the term decision used in this research report. The decision includes
both the recommendatic '1S and the announcement.
6.2.1. Phase 1: Arriving at the recommendations
For Phase 1, the Rational Actor model (or paradigm) shaped the thinking of
most actors. National interest formed the basis for the recommendation.
Within oroanlsatlons, the bureaucratic politics model was active (notably
DFA 8. SACP). Overall, the organisational process model had very weak
impact. After the conflict and debate within organisations ran its course, a
'democratic' majority decision making consensus was reached. The result
of this consensus was acceptet as the recommendation, which was used to
'lobby' the President. This phase had different managers. Within each
organisation and structure a particular individual, sometimes a group,
ensured that the organisation or structure decidr to switch. These 'actors or
elites' managed the process within their particular structure or organisation.
However none of them had any real power to influence Phase 2.
6.2.2. Phase 2: Arriving at the announcement
For Phase 2, only the President decided. His personality, sense of morality,
values and worldview impacted. There is no evidence that anyone of the
other three models were active. None of the three or the proposed hybrid
approach can explain the delays, the specific timing of the announcement
etc. Due to his position power and personality the President was crucial to
this decision. Phase 1 amount to a futile exercise without phase 2. But
Phase 2 is not necessarily dependent on phase 1. The President can, and
does (according to many interviewees) follow his whims and pronounce on
foreign policy issues. He acts independently from phase 1 but phase 1
actors or agitators or managers cannot act without him.
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Even though the Department of Foreign Affairs sent the recommendation to
the President (via the official channels, two years before the
announcement, they were taken by surprise completely by the timing of the
announcement. The academics those wno were pro-People's Republic of
China and those who were pro-Republic of China were surprised. Even
members of parliament and cabinet were surprised. Members of the SACP
were also caught unawares. The announcement was kept secret. It had top
secret treatment. According to Joel Ntsitenze, the President took the
decision seven days before the announcement. He alone decided on who
woind know before hand. He only had consultations wich the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of China's representative's two days
before the announcement. The Republic of China's ambassador was also
caught off guard by the announcement. (Chris Landsberg, personal
communication, November 28th, 1996) and The Star 28-11- 1996).
6.3. The realist paradigm
It appears that South Africa's foreign policy is dominated by a realist
paradlqrn". The results show that every interviewee identified that South
Africa's national interest" was the reason why the decision was made. It
was the rationale behind the decision. Many actors from different
organisations, with different views (pro or anti the People's Republic of
China) displayed agreement on the fact that Foreign Policy should be made
4 The term realist paradigm is used here in the sense as explained by McGowan (1995: 27)
of a neo realism that focuses on social and economic security issues and not the old kind
of realism that focused on traditional national military security issues.
5 By national interest the interviewees meant economic interest. The reasons often quoted
was the large market in the PRC and trade and investment from Hong Kong combineci
overshadow completely the trade and investment from the ROC.
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on the basis of the national interest of the South Africa. Most of them also
agree on what the national interest of South Africa was on this particular
issue. Therefore most of them came to the same conclusion. (I.e., South
Africa must switch to the People's Republic of China).
It is true that most of the elements of the Rational Actor Model as defined
by the researcher, was not identified as relevant by the interviewees.
However, It does seem that the interviewees strongly agreed on two
aspects of this model, firstly there is general agreement in principle that
national interest should form the basis for foreign policy decision making in
South Africa. Secondly there is agreement on what the national interest of
South Africa is on the 'China' decision.
Agreement on these two aspects led to the 'consensus on the maximising
alternative' (an element taken from the Rational Actor model) which in this
case was switching from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of
China. If one understands the decision in this context, it makes it easier to
understand why the " different alignment of forces within the African
National Congress, its alliance partners and Thabo Mbeki" agreed with the
decision. Even those (within the African National Congress and its alliance
partners and within the National Party-opposition party), who felt that South
Africa should continue to recognise the Republic of China "knew that it was
inevitable" (Matthew Phosa, personal communication, March 22nd, 1997).
Diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was the only
choice South Africa could make. Those rJissenting seem to have only
wanted South Africa to stay with the Republic of China for a longar time
pe. iod. So the surprising phenomenon happened in South Africa where a
majority of individuals from different creeds, colours, political persuasions,
etc. agreed on the switch. The differences were on the timing.
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It appears that it was difficult to balance the probability of economic
advantages from diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China,
that is, "Realpolitik" (Jeremy Cronin, personal communication, December
5th, 1996) with issues of morality, (for example the human rights record of
the People's Republic of China).
6.4. The Person; lity of the President
It appears that the foreign policy decision making process in South Africa
allows space for the impact or personalities. It allowed for the personality of
the President and the "benignly autocratic, stubborn impulsive erratic"
leadership style of the President (various interviewees). Therefore the
humanness, (the human faults in om) respect) of the President, his larger
than life aura" (Chris Landsberg, personal communication, November 28th,
1996) and his image in the minds of the international community impacted
strongly on the 'China' decision.
The President's "autocratic style" (according to one interviewee) r~garding
this matter is difficult for the researcher to clarify. On the one hand he nnally
subjected himself to the democratic process and the decision that was
arrived at through this democratic process, within the African National
Congress, its alliance partners ,Ild within the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Department 01 Irade and Industry and many other departments. Even
though the South African Defence Force wanted the status quo to remain,
they agreed on economic benefits (arms sales) as the prime basis for
foreign policy decision making.
On the other hand, the President, "stubbornly refu-; ,:til (according to one
interviewee), to implement the decisions made bt (he African National
Congress National Executive Council (ANC) around end of 1995. The
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numerous recommendations by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the
recommendations coming from the groups that went on the fact finding
missions was "ignored" (according to another interviewee).
Possibly if one could identify what belief system drives the actions of a
leader one could then explain his apparently "erratic" (Kate Kuper, personal
communication, November 28th, 1997) behaviour. Van Nieuwkerk and van
Wyk, 1989, tackled a similar problem by using Holsti's typology of political
beliefs as a framework of analysis. They show that PW Botha displayed a
typical B-type foreign policy belief system which was compatible with the
realist paradigm and which had consequences for South Africa's foreign
policy during his (PW Botha's) term as president of South Africa. They
isolated PW Botha's beliefs about the nature of political life and his beliefs
about the adversary'. 1 his analysis explained why Botha pursued pragmatic
foreign pollcles at the cost of human rights (e.g. destabilisation of the SADe
region).
The fact that none of the Raiional Actor model, the Organisational Process
model, the Bureaucratic Politics model nor the hybrid approach provide a
satisfactory framework of analysis led to the development of a different
framework of analysis called model Z6 for the sake of convenience. The
researcher identified the elements of this different framework (model Z) by
Ur ir,'.~ Juugement calls based on knowledge of the decision making
process on the 'China' decision, the responses of the interviewees, and
llte.ature for example Toma and Gorman: 1991; Hilsman et.al.: 1993; and
Allison: 1969.
6 Model z is not a completely developed theoretical model like the Rational Actor model. It
is merely a way of looking at the data that can form the basis of a future model or
framework of analysis.
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The elements are Model Z's answers to the questlor.s posed by the six
themes developed previously in chapter 2.
The different framework of analysis (model Z) is summarised in the
following table:
MATRIX 5: MATRIX OF THEMES AND MODEL Z
Themes M')deiZ
Nature of governance • Sompeting centres of power (e.g.
autonomous and competing elite groups)
inside and outside of government; public
opinion
• International opinion or precedent
Basis of decisions • Consensus (reached after) consultation,
crisis, conflict and debate
Climate or context of • Pressures from a number of competing
decision groups
• Minimal role for some institutions
(government departments I individuals);
greater role for political party structures and
allies
Kind of decision • High level, politically sensitive
Decision tool used • Presidential decree
Management • Manager: Different managers at different
stages of the process. The PresidenU
presidency decides. (ultimately the buck
I
stops with the President I presidency)
Management process:
• Unplanned, iterative, muddling through
• Choice and preferences ot president I
presidency prevails
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6.5. Summary
The President overshadowed the decision making process regarding the
'China' decision. The centre for foreign policy making on the 'China'
decision was not in the Department of Foreign Affairs but rather in the
President's offlce. The rational actor model I realist pi 'adiqrn is used by
the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Trade and Industry
and other structures and organisations to arrive at the recommendations.
From that point it depended on the President whether he listened to these
recommendations which essentially constitute a "lobby".
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
7.1. Introduction
This chapter firstly summarises the report and secondly spells out the
conclusions the researcher has reached. Chapter one introduces the
problem, situates it in its particular context and states the objectives of the
research. Besides reviewing the writings of various South Africans on this
diplomatic dilemma, the theuretical underpinnings of the research are
detailed in chapter two. The three decision-making models described in
chapter two are the Rational Actor model, the Organisational Process
model and the Bureaucratic Politics model. The researcher develops a
proposition from examining the three models and apply'nq it tentatively to
the research problem. This proposition is detailed and substantiated in
chapter three. The researcher postulates that none of the three theoretical
models, on its own, is able to provide an satisfactory framework for analysis
of the complex management of the decision making process to switch
diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic
of China. Therefore the researcher proposes that a combination of the three
models, called a hybrid approach, can provide a satisfactory framework of
analysls. The research methodology used to examine the problem and 'test'
the proposition is case study methodology that is explained in chapter four.
Chapter five presents and analysis the data. The views of the fourteen
people interviewed are presented as fully as possible in this chapter.
Analysis of documents and interviews were used to draw up the chronology
that appears in appendix 8. The researcher's interpretation of the data
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comprises chapter six which leads to the conclusion and additional insights
detailed in this chapter.
7.2. The decision making process
Essentially the decision making process was not one complete process. It
consisted of two phases. Phase 1 led to the development of a reasonably
large consensus on the recommendation. This recommendation was that it
was in the national interest of South Africa to transfer diplomatic relations
from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. The second
process, called Phase 2 by the researcher, led to the announcement on 2ih
November 1996 and was overshadowed by the personality and leadership
style of the President.
In essence the researcher's proposition that a hybrid approach is a
satisfactory framework for analysing the decision making process of the
decision to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the
People's Republic of China, was proven false by the data.
7.3. Ideas for future Research
Many unanswered questions remain. Neither models (Rational Actor,
Organisational Process, and Bureauc.atic Politics) nor the combined
(Hybrid) approach explains the timing of the announcement. None of the
models or a combined (Hybrid) approach explains the contradictory
statements by the President, the "flip-flops" (Jeremy Cronin, personal
communication, December 5th, 1996). This is one aspect of the research
where the researcher could not find any answers, not even from one of the
President's advisors, Mr. Joel Ntshitenze.
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It appears that the models and hybrid approach used in this study has
important inadequacies. It does not explain how the worldview of a leader
like President Mandela impacts on his management of a decision making
process. It does not explain how his personal decision making structure
work. It does not explain on what basis he makes decisions, nor the belief
system undo..tying his actions.
Therefore a future study need to look at the following questions:
• What wili happen to foreign policy making regarding sensitive issues if
President Mandela is not in offlce any more?
• Will the deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, continue to have the same
influence on foreign policy making in general!
.. In particular, will he continue the practice of maki'lg the decision on
sensitive issues?
• Will he continue to completely overshadow (at least in the eyes of the
public) the minister of foreign affairs?
• In other words, is this research result 'accidental' because of the
specific circumstances and the present President's personality?
" Or is this a trend that will continue to characterise South Africa's foreign
policy decision making process?
A future study could use the methodology used by van Nieuwkerk and van
Wyk (1989), or further develop the framework of analysis called model Z in
this study into a new theoretical decision making model. The new model
could then be used as a framework of analysis alongside the three
traditional ones (The Rational Actor, Organisational Proceos and
Bureaucratic Politics models). These ideas can form the basis ~\f a very
interesting study ill future.
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7.3. Conclusion
The models and approaches utilised, or described in this study, only explain
a small percentage of the complexity of managing foreign policy decision
making processes. Possibly other models, or development of new ones
based on model Z, can be used to develop a deeper understanding of a
decls'on like the 'China' decision. This framework could then be u- ." to
explore why President Mandela maintained diplomatic relatlc::
beginning of his term in office in 1994, until December 31st, 1b, \'
Republic of China. It could possibly also explain the suddennes.
announcement of the 'China' decision on 27th November 1996.
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APPENDIX 1 List of open-ended semi-structured
questions
1. In terms of South Africa's relations with the People's Republic of China
/Republ:c of China how does the 'foreign policy decision making process
work?
2. Who in your opinion, are the decision makers in this regard?
3. Who prepares the data and information needed to make the decision?
4. What is the structure in the department (reference to organogram and
hierarchy). Where are you placed in the structure? What is your role in the
decision making process? (for those interviewees within government
departmental roles)
5. Who in your opinion influences the decision making process? How is
influence exerted?
6. What criteria were used by decision makers in this regard?
a. Historical facts/relationships?
b. political factors?
c. economical benefits for South Africa?
d. Trade
e. Investment?
f. human rightc
g. loyalty to old friends/ present friends
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h. Strategic (what is your definition of strategic considerations?)
i. Short term and medium term interests of SA? (Can you identify at least 5
most important criteria you consider to be in the short term and medium
term (1996-1999) interest of SA?)
j. Long term interests of SA? (Can you identify at least the five most
important criteria in the long term interest( 1999 and beyond) of SA that
impact on thin decision?
k. In YOLT opinion, which of the three i.e. short term, medium term or long
term criteria, will weigh heaviest in the making of the final decision?
I. any other crlterla that you think is important?
7. How can one characterise the decision making on the 'China' decision?
As crisis management / consensus seeking? If so- Why? If not which "term"
can be used?
8. Do you think that wide consultation on this matter is necessary? If not
Why not? If so, Why? Which interest groups, organisations or individuals
not necessarily in government, should be consulted?
9. Do you thinl< that sufficient role players and stakeholder opinions are
canvassed (If not, which stakeholders and role players do you think should
be included?) Do you think that the inputs from stakeholders and role
players will be taken into account to formulate the medium to long term
decision?
10. In your view how are long term consequences taken into account in
formulating the decision?(?)
11. Are you using a particular tool e.g. decision trees to arrive at the
decision?
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APPENDIX 2 The relevance of the research
questions to the achievement of the research
objectives
., to establish who makes foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South Africa
2. Who in your opinion are the decision makers in this regard?
., to establish who influences foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South
Africa
3. Who prepares the data and information needed to make the decision?
4. What is the structure in the department ( reference to organogram and
hierarchy) Where are you placed in the structure? What is your role in the
decision making process? (for those interviewees within government
departmental roles)
8. [10 you think that wide consultation on this matter is necessary? If not
Why not? If so, Why? Which interest groups orqanlsations or individuals
not necessarily ir, government should be consulted?
.. to establish what decision making process the decision maker/a engage in.
• In terms of SA's relations with the PRe/ROC how does the foreign policy
decision making process work?
1. What is the structure in the department ( reference to organogram and
hierarchy) Where are you placed in the structure? What is your role in the
decision making process? (for those interviewees within government
departmental roles)
8. Do you think that wide consultation on this matter is necesoaiy? If not
Why not? If so, Why? Which interest groups organisations or individuals
not necessarily in government should be consulted?
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9. Do you think that sufficient role players and stakeholder opinions are
canvassed (If not, which stakeholders and role players do you think should
be included?) Do you think that the inputs from stakeholders ana role
players will be taken into account to formulate the medium to long term
decision;
11. Are you using a particular tool e.g. decision trees to arrive at the
decision?
.. to identify on which principle/s the decision makers base the decision
• to identify which priorities drive the decision
• to establish how thr tensions between different principles and different
priorities impact on South African foreign policy decision making.
6. What criteria is used by the decision makers in this regard?
a. Historical?
b. political?
c. economical-
d. Trade
e. Investment?
f. human rights
g. loyalty to old friends/ pre' ent friends
h. Strategic (what is your definition of strategic considerations?)
i. Short term and medium term interests of SA? (Can you identify at least 5
most important criteria you consider to be in the short term, and medium
term(1996-1999) interest of SA?)
j. Long term interests of SA? (Can you identify the at least 5 most important
criteria in the long term interest( 1£'99 and beyond) of SA that Impact on this
decision?
k. In your opinion, which of the three i.e. short term, medium term or long
term criteria, will weigh heaviest in the making of the final decision?
I. any other criteria that you think is important?
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10. In your view how are long term consequences taken into account in
formulating the decision?
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APPENDIX 3 list of interviewees
Department of Foreign I\ffairs
(t Mr. laan Basson- Acting Director-Department of Foreign Affairs-East Asian
Desk.
Date: 29-11-1996
• Mr. Machiel van Niekerk - Deputy Director-Department of Foreign
Affairs -East Asian Desk.
Dates: 20-11··1997 and 29 -11- 1997
• Johan Kotze - Deputy Director Department of Fureign Affairs - Latin
American Desk
date: 16-01-1997
Department of Trade and Industry
• Key Informant-Kate Kuper-Deputy Director East Asian Desk. Presently
Deputy Director Industrial Policy-Department of Trade and Industry.
Date: Friday, 29 November 1997.
• Nitesh Du!labh- Assistant Director-East Asia-responsible for Republic of
China, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Australia etc.
Date: 4-12-1996
Office of tile President
Joel Ntshitenze
Position: Presidential advisor and Chief of communications in the office of
the President
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Date: 26~11~1997
Dl ~artment of Defence:
Colonel Rocky Williams
Position: Director of the Policy Unit (South African National Defence Force)
Date: 31~11-1997
Provincial Premier
Mr. Matthews Phosa,
Position: Premier of the Mpumalanga Province
Uate: 22-03-1997
Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Foreign Affairs
Mr.Raymond Suttner
Position: Chairman: Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Foreign Affairs
Date: 04~12-1996
Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Trade and Industry
Mr. Robert Davies- chairperson of the above mentioned committee.
Date: 18~02-1997
National Executive Council (African National Congress ) cornrnittee on
Foreign Affairs
Mr. Blade Nzimande- chairperson of committee
Date: 03-12-1997
South African Communist Party
Mr. Jeremy Cronin (Secretary of the Central Committee of the SACP)
Date: 05-12-1996
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Non Governmental Organisations
Centre for Policy Studies
Mr. Chris Landsberg- Researcher responsible for Foreign Policy lssues
Date: 28-11-1996
P.J. Botha. Asia -Paciflc desk ABSA and chairperson East-Asia Society
Date: 13-12-1996
APPENDIX 4: Elements of the decision making
models
Rational Actor model
Nature of governance:
T1-1-a united purposive strategists who are rational actors / individuals
T1-1-b no dissent among policy makers
decisions based on:
T2-1-a rational steps:
specification of goals; ranking goals according to priorities; consider all
means for reaching objectives
select objective that will maximise goal achievement; full information
T2-1-b national Interest / goal is maximisation of economic
benefits/security/power
Climate /context of decision
T3-1-a no uncertainty & full information
T3-1-b cultural and ideological differences causes no differences in
lnterpretetion
Kind of decision:
T4-1-a Consensus on maxim'sinq alternative
Decision tool used:
T5-1-a cost benefit analysis
Management
T6-1-a Manager: combined efforts of rational policy making group
T6-1-b Manar~ment process: pre-arranged, strategically planned process
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APPENDIX 4 (continued)
Elements of the decision making models
Organisational Process Model
Nature of qoverne.nce:
T1-2-a conglomerate of loosely allied organisations
T1-2-b standardised individual behaviour
T1-2-c predictable behaviour
T1-2-d bureaucratic nature
Decisions based on:
T2-2-a rules
T2-2-b precedence
Climate/context of decision:
T3-2-a certainty created by standard operating procedures
Kind of decision:
T4-2-a routine
Decision tool used:
T5-2-a standardised rule making
Management
T6-2-a Manager: rulebook
T6-2-b Management of process: standerd organisational procedures
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APPENDIX 4 (continued)
Elements of the decision making models
Bureaucratic Politics model
Nature of governance:
T1-3-a lack of consensus among bureaucrats
T1-3-b different actors exist
T1-3-c actors with different roles
T1-3-d actors with different power and influence according to position power
T1-3-e hierarchy of power
Decisions based on:
T2-3-a bureaucratic power & influence
Climate / context of decision:
T3-3-a inter departmental conflict
T3-3-b minimal role for external influences from politicians or extra
parliamentary groups and "public opinion"
Kind of decision:
T4-3-a deal
Decision tool used:
T5-3-a bargaining
Management
T6-3-a Manager: bureaucrat
T6-3-b Management of process: resultant of bureaucratic politicking
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Appendix 5- A Different Framework
FrameworkZ
Nature of governanr.e:
T1-4-a competing centres of power (e.g. autonomous and competing" elite"
groups) inside and outside of government; public opinion
T l-4-b international opinion or precedent
Decisions based on:
T2-4-a Consensus (reached after) consultation, crisis, conflict and debate
T2-4-b information gathering (including rnformation on international
precedence)
Climate Icontext of decision
T3-4-a uncertainty, risk, secrecy & imperfections
T3-4-b pressures from a number of competing interest groups
T3-4-c minimal role for some institutions, seme government departments,
individuals; greater role for political party structures and allies
Kind of decision:
T4-4-high level, politically sensitive
Decision tool used:
T5-4-a Presidential decree
Management:
T6-4-a Manager: different managers at different stages of the process but
President I presidency decides ultimately.
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Management process: -
T6-4-b Unplanned, iterative, muddling through
T6-4-bb choice and preferences of president! presidency prevails
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APPENDIX 6- ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS I THEMES
Th/lnt 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 110 I~1 112 113 114
T1-1-a I
T1-1-b X X
T2-1-a
T2-1-b X X X X X X X v X X X X X XI\.
T3-1-a X X X
T3-1-b
--l-
X
I
T4-1-a X X X X X X
T5-1-a X X X
T6-1-a
T6-1-b
T1-2-a
T1-2-a
T1-2-b
T1-2-c
T1-2-0FA
- -
T2-2-a (
-
12-2-b
T3-2-a
T4-2-a
T5-2-a ._ -
T6-2-a
I
T6-2-b ,,
T1-3-a X X X X
T1-3-b X X
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I
1-1 11-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 110 111 112 113 1~4
T1-3-c X X x I I
T1-3-d X X X
T1-3-e X X i
T2-3-a
T3-3-a X X X X
-
T3-3-b X I x X
T4-3-a
TS-3-a
T6-3-a
T6-3-b
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APPENDIX 7 - Model Z
Th/lnt 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 110 111 112 113 114
T1-4-a X X X X X X x I x x X
T1-4-b X X X X X X X X X X
T2-4-a X X X X X X X X X X X
T2-4-b X X X X X X X X X X
T3-4-a X X X X X X X
T3-4-b X X X X X X X X X X
._
T3-4-c X X X X X X X X
T4-4-a X X X X
T5-4-a X X X X X X X X X X X X X
T6-4-a X X X X X X X X X X X X
T6-4-b X X X X X X X X X
T6-4-bb X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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APPENDIX 8: THE SIX THE'VIES MATCHED TO THE
SECONDARY OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCi'i
• establish who makes foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South Africa
e Management: manager and management process-Theme 6
fI establish who influences foreign policy decisions in 1994-1996 South i\frica
• Basis of decisions - Theme 2
• Decision tool used-Theme 5
c establish what decision making process the decision maker/s engage in
• Basis of decisions-Theme 2
• Climate / Context of decision-Theme 3
• Kind of Decision-Theme 4
• identify on which principie/s the decision makers base the decision
• Nature of governance-Theme 1
• Basis of decisions-Theme 2
• Management- Theme 6
• identify which and whose priorities drive the decision
• Nature of governance-Theme 1
• Basis of decisions-Theme 2
• Management- Theme 6
• establish the impact of the tensions between different principles and
priorities on South African foreign policy decision making.
• Climate / Context of decision-Theme 3
• Basis of decisions-Theme 2
II Kind of Decision-Theme 4
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APPENDIX 9: CHRONOLOGY
Date: Event
1895/05/25 Local population on island of Formosa (Taiwan) resist Japanese
takeover and declare independence aft6r the Treaty of
Shimonoseki was signed by Japan _.fld the C~'ng court (who were
the rulers of all of China at the time) on the ce...sion of Taiwar to
1,'95/10
Japan and declare an independent Republic of Taiwan
Japanese suppress the resistance by the people on Taiwan and
the Republic of Taiwan went out of existence
1943/12/01 Cairo declaration: Issued by China, the USA and the U~, stating
that Japan .:;hall be stripped of all the islands in the pacific which
she has sei. t;!1j or occupied since the beginning of the First World
war in 1914 and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the
Chines such as Manchuria, Formosa (Tiawan) and the Pescadores
(Penghu) shall be restored to China
1945/07/26 Potsdam declaration signed by China, the US and the UK- adhered
to by the Soviet Union, reiterated the that the terms of the Cairo
Declaration shari be carried out
1945/10/25 The ceremony for accepting the Japanese surrender to the allied
powers. From this day forward Taiwan and the Penghu
Archipelago had again been incorporated formally into the territory
of China and the territory, people and administration had been
placed under the Sovereignty of China.
1953 First African National Congress delegation to PRC Led by Walter
Sisulu ('(""g:1997,p.4)
1960's First groups of ANC recruits sent to PRe for military training
1960's Sino-Soviet ~lsputeE impact on PRC ANC &SACP relationship
Leads to break in ANC & SACP relations wit;, PRC
(Yang:1997,p4)
1969 Apartheid South Africa-Taiwan contact-establish consulates in each
other's countries
1971 People's Republic of China recognised as only legal government
for all of China by UN (UN resolution 2758 of 1971)
1976 South Africa-Republic of Chine' diplomatic recognition
1979 USA de-recognises Taiwan
1986 Visit of Nzo to Beijing as ANC official
1989 Visit of Nzo to Beijing as ANC official
'1989 Pik Botha then South Africa's m nister of Foreign Affairs starts
dialogue with PRC
1991 Negotiations between South Afl :ca -People's Republic of China re
Unofficial Missions to be opened: called Study Centres
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r:r992/03 Opening of .he South !\frican Centre of Chinese studies-Beijing
'1992/03 Pik Botha visit to Taipei
1994103/27 Election for new South Africa gov0rnment -ANC elected ruling
party --1994/03/27 Inauguration of President Mandela
ROC official delegation led by president Lee
PRC low level unofficial deleqauon attends
1995/05 SACP decision taken that South Africa must r8 .oqnise the PRe
1995/11 National Executive Committee (ANC) decision that South Africa
must recognise the PRC
1995/12 National Executive Committee (ANC), request governrllent to
dispatch a delegation to ~hina (PRC) "as soon as possible"
1996/01/20 Meeting held at home of deputy president Thabo tvlbeki attended
by top management of Department of Foreign Affairs and Thabo
Mbeki, decided in principle to initiate negotiations on recognition
with the People's Republic of China. The target date for recognition
of the PRC set at this meeting was before 01-07-1997 [the Hong
Kong hand over deadline]
1996/01/25 Courtesy call by tvlr. Gu Xinger (new Director of Chinese Centre for
South African Studies) to deputy minister Pahad
1996/02/03 Ji Peiding (PRC Assistant Minister for Africa and Middle East)
stated that "South Africa already having a semi-official misslon in
Beijing, would not be allowed to have another semi-official mission
in China [referring to the Hong Kong South African consulate]
1996/02/06 DDG of Department of Trade and Industry, M. G. Breyl and Ms.
to Kate KUPer visit Beijing to discuss the contents of the proposed
1996/02/07 exchange of notes establishing an tvlFN agreement between South
.' Africa and People's Republic of China .
1S96/02/12 Visit of People's Republic of China's Gu-Xinqer to South Africa.
to Meets with Rev. frank chikane, Zola Sweyiya, Alfred Nzo
1996/02/17
1996/02/23 President Mandela hosts dinner for PRC's Gu Xinger in Cape
Town. ('<tlci suests include R.Suttner, representatives from Cosatu
and tt la SACP
Gu Xinger makes following statement "a person should not be
judged by his words, but by his actions."
1996/03/07 President Mandela informs various political institutlous and trade
unions that he will send a team to China to lnvestiqats the situation.
This team will have a mandate to discuss breaking relations with
either sides. Discussion will be on how to overcome the problem of
having diplomatic relations with both Chinas.
Communication received from Beijing mission advising Department
of Foreign Affairs not to schedule Minister Nzo's visit to Beijino.3!!_
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the time when Taiwan is having their presidential elections.
1996/03/12 SACP delegation visit 8eijing led by general secretary of the SACP
to Mr. Charles Nqakula, others in dele qation Arnold Stofile, Kay
1996/03/20 Moonsamy, Philip Dexter, Arthur Botha
1996/03/15 SACP delegation to Beijing met President and General secretary of
the epc, Mr. Jiang Zermin. A party to party meeting between
SACP and CPC.
1996/03/23 Presidential delegation to PRC led by Minister Nzo (Department of
to Foreign Affairs).
1996/03/26
1996/03 Planning for Madame Wu's visit to South Africa during April 198.
and May 1996
Request received by Department of Foreign Affairs via mission in
Beijing from De Beers and Nedbank, SAB and other companies,
who wish to host Madr.me Wu deuring her visit to South Africa.
1996/04/28 Mandela discussed switching to PRC with Dr. Boutros Boutros-Sall
(DFA docume-it)
1996/04/29 Courtesy call on Min. Nzo by Madame Wu (PRC -Min. of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation)
1996/04/30 Meeting of Madame Wu Yi & President Mandela
1926/06/11 Aide Memoir to protest against PRC nuclear test on 7/611997
Handed to Mr. Gu, Xin'er, Director of the Chinese Centre in
Pretoria by Ms. T.E. Mazibuko(DDG-DFA)
1996/07/04 Mandela press conference with French journalists during this week
Where he announced that South Africa will not break ties with
Republic of China
1996/0'1104 Request for clarification of the statement attributed to pres.
Mandela at a press briefing to French journalists that South Africa
-1996/08/26
would not sacrifice its diplomatic relations with Taipei
ROC Trade and investment Mission to South Africa -led by Vice -
to Premier Hsu Li-The
1996109103
1996/06/30 Presidential delegation to ROC led by Minister Nzo (Department of
to Foreign Affairs document).
1996/07/02
1996/08/26 Mandela stated to media that South Africa will not break ties with
Taiwan
1996/09/02 PRC Reaction to Mandela press statement on staying with Taiwan
Made by Mr. Shen Guofang the PRC foreign ministry's press
spokesman
1996 Invitation to chairman of Armscor and chief of SAAF by Mr. Wang
Dawei, Vice-Preside~t of the China National Aero-Technological
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Import and Export Corporation
1996/09/20 Xinhua News Agency send important delegation to South Africa to
to inspect Xinhua offices in Jhb, and interact with important South
1996/09/29 African news agencies
1997/04 Planned visit to PRe by western cape province led by premier kriel
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